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REINVENTING THE TRIAL:
THE INNOCENCE REVOLUTION
AND PROPOSALS TO MODIFY THE
AMERICAN CRIMINAL TRIAL*
By: Marvin Zalman** and Ralph Grunewald***
ABSTRACT
Law review articles by D. Michael Risinger, Tim Bakken, Keith Findley,
Samuel Gross, and Christopher Slobogin have proposed modifications to pre-
trial and trial procedures designed to reduce wrongful convictions. Some fit
within the adversary model and others have “inquisitorial” features. We com-
pare and evaluate the recommendations from the perspectives of lawyer-schol-
ars trained in the United States and Germany. We examine the proposals for
their novelty, feasibility, complexity, likely impact, and possible negative or
positive side effects. This Article describes, compares, and critically analyzes
the articles; suggests additional truth-enhancing procedural reforms; and pro-
vides a platform for further analysis.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Five legal scholars—D. Michael Risinger, Tim Bakken, Samuel
Gross, Keith Findley, and Christopher Slobogin—have recently (in
2004, 2008, and 2014) written speculative essays that modify or jetti-
son traditional elements of the adversary trial process in an effort to
improve verdict accuracy and avoid wrongful convictions.1 These pro-
posals came after two decades of innocence scholarship occasioned by
growing awareness of DNA exonerations and the rise of “innocence
consciousness—the idea that innocent people are convicted in suffi-
ciently large numbers as a result of systemic justice system problems
to require efforts to exonerate them, and to advance structural re-
forms to reduce such errors in the first place.”2 Innocence movement
scholarship has minutely examined most possible causes of wrongful
convictions from the specific (fabrications by “jailhouse snitches”)3 to
the global (“tunnel vision”),4 with extensive research into eyewitness
misidentification and false confessions by psychological scientists.5
1. Tim Bakken, Truth and Innocence Procedures to Free Innocent Persons: Be-
yond the Adversarial System, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 547 (2008) [hereinafter Bak-
ken]; Keith A. Findley, Adversarial Inquisitions: Rethinking the Search for the Truth,
56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 911 (2011/2012) [hereinafter Findley]; Samuel R. Gross, Pre-
trial Incentives, Post-Conviction Review, and Sorting Criminal Prosecutions by Guilt
or Innocence, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1009 (2011/2012) [hereinafter Gross]; D.
Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for Reformed Standards for the Trial and
Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1281 (2004) [hereinafter Risin-
ger]; Christopher Slobogin, Lessons From Inquisitorialism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 699
(2014) [hereinafter Slobogin].
2. Marvin Zalman, An Integrated Justice Model of Wrongful Convictions, 74 ALB.
L. REV. 1465, 1468 (2010/2011) (emphasis added). Several landmark publications
helped raise “innocence consciousness,” including EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CON-
VICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996), https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf [http://perma.cc/NX2H-9QTZ], and BARRY SCHECK ET AL., AC-
TUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION, AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE
WRONGLY CONVICTED (Doubleday 2000).
3. Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to Wrongful
Convictions, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 107 (2006).
4. Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vi-
sion in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291.
5. See, e.g., CONVICTION OF THE INNOCENT: LESSONS FROM PSYCHOLOGICAL RE-
SEARCH (Brian L. Cutler ed., Am. Psychological Ass’n 2012); EXAMINING WRONGFUL
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Writing on legal actors, especially ineffective assistance of counsel6
and prosecutorial misconduct,7 is extensive. By contrast, scholarship
specifically about trial and pre-trial processes as wrongful conviction
factors has been comparatively sparse,8 but it is growing.9 The adver-
sary trial does not appear on any canonical list of wrongful conviction
causes.10 We note that prior to the current pressing concerns with
wrongful convictions, several distinguished scholars raised concerns
regarding adversary trials, some of which resulted in wrongful
acquittals.11
The lack of attention to the trial process is rather curious because
alongside psychological research on eyewitness misidentification, false
confessions, and child witnesses,12 the bulk of wrongful conviction
scholarship appears in law review articles.13 The lack of focus on the
CONVICTIONS: STEPPING BACK, MOVING FORWARD (Allison D. Redlich et al. eds.,
Carolina Acad. Press 2014).
6. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, “Potential Innocence”: Making the Most of a
Bleak Environment for Public Support of Indigent Defense, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1345 (2013).
7. See, e.g., H. Mitchell Caldwell, The Prosecutor Prince: Misconduct, Accounta-
bility, and a Modest Proposal, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 51 (2013).
8. See Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We
Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317 (1997); F. Andrew Hessick
III & Reshma M. Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent: The Role of
the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189 (2002);
Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123 (2005).
9. See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMI-
NAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 145-77 (Harvard Univ. Press 2011); DAN SIMON, IN
DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 144–205 (Harvard
Univ. Press 2012).
10. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 173, 186 (2008) (listing “eyewitness misidentification; false confession; mislead-
ing, false, or fraudulent forensic evidence; testimony by highly motivated police infor-
mants such as ‘jailhouse snitches’; perjury in general; prosecutorial misconduct;
ineffective legal defense”).
11. To name a few, see WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH: WHY OUR
SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL TRIALS HAS BECOME AN EXPENSIVE FAILURE AND WHAT WE
NEED TO DO TO REBUILD IT (N.Y. Univ. Press 1999); MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTI-
SAN JUSTICE (Hill & Wang 1978); MACKLIN FLEMING, THE PRICE OF PERFECT JUS-
TICE: THE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF CURRENT LEGAL DOCTRINE ON THE
AMERICAN COURTROOM (Basic Books 1974); FRANKLIN STRIER, RECONSTRUCTING
JUSTICE: AN AGENDA FOR TRIAL REFORM (Quorum Books 1994). For a critique of
the American adversary process by a philosopher, see LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ER-
ROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2006). Jerome Frank remains the classical and in some ways unsurpassed source
of this kind of critique. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (Transac-
tion Publishers 2009) (1930); JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REAL-
ITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (Princeton Univ. Press 1949).
12. See Richard A. Leo, Rethinking the Study of Miscarriages of Justice: Develop-
ing Criminology of Wrongful Conviction, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 201 (2005).
13. From about 1990 to the mid-2000s, a plethora of articles were published on
such wrongful conviction-related issues as the habeas corpus innocence gateway (re-
acting to Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993)); false confessions; videotaping inter-
rogations; DNA evidence; post-conviction DNA statutes to test claims of innocence;
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trial process might have resulted from its omission in Scheck and
Neufeld’s influential innocence agenda14 or from a clutch of legal is-
sues that absorbed doctrinal analysis, such as habeas corpus. Likewise,
lawyers’ ideology may have blinded them from seeing the trial system
itself as a source of error,15 or changing the adversary trial process
may have seemed too theoretical and remote. Whatever the reason,
the result is that tinkering with the trial has not been a part of the
innocence reform agenda. The time for reassessing the heart of the
adversary process may have come, as seen in the essays reviewed
herein, which propose various accuracy-enhancing and inquisitorial-
like modifications of the American adversary trial. Keith Findley best
expressed the motivation for these proposals:
If one were asked to start from scratch and devise a system best
suited to ascertaining the truth in criminal cases, and to ensuring
that, to the extent any unavoidable errors in fact-finding occur, they
do not fall on the shoulders of innocent suspects, what would that
system look like? It is inconceivable that one would create a system
bearing much resemblance to the criminal justice process we now
have in the United States.16
The study of wrongful conviction narratives suggests that the standard
list of wrongful conviction causes does not capture all the ways that
justice can miscarry, and that trial processes may have generated or
allowed wrongful convictions.17 Suggesting structural changes to trial
procedures is no small matter. The trial process is complex, grounded
mistaken eyewitness identification; ineffective legal defense; prosecutorial miscon-
duct; racism; death penalty; expert witnesses; child witness accuracy and suggestibility;
repressed/recovered memory; and more. The relative lack of attention to judicial
processes was noticed by Bakken, supra note 1, and Marvin Zalman, The Adversary
System and Wrongful Convictions, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION: INTERNATIONAL PER-
SPECTIVES ON MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 71, 79 (C. Ronald Huff & Martin Killias
eds., Temple Univ. Press 2008) [hereinafter Zalman, Adversary System]. Advances in
DNA profiling, of course, were laying the groundwork for the innocence revolution.
See MICHAEL LYNCH ET AL., TRUTH MACHINE: THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF
DNA FINGERPRINTING (Univ. of Chi. Press 2008).
14. Barry Scheck not only constructed an inductive list of wrongful conviction
causes but worked to instill a mission among criminal law scholars to establish addi-
tional innocence projects to expand the innocence movement agenda. SCHECK ET AL.,
supra note 2.
15. Zalman, Adversary System, supra note 13. “Lawyers and judges are inculcated
with the notion that the system works well and there is nothing to worry about. And
perhaps it’s true. But there are far too many uncertainties for us to be complacent.”
Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xviii
(2015). As this Article entered final editing, Judge Kozinski’s stunning and detailed
indictment of elements of the criminal justice and trial process appeared. Several of
his observations are added herein that bolster the Authors’ arguments and
observations.
16. Findley, supra note 1, at 912.
17. See Jon B. Gould et al., Predicting Erroneous Convictions, 99 IOWA L. REV.
471 (2014).
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in a quasi-religious constitutional ideology, and is slow to change be-
cause it is guarded by an inherently conservative legal culture.
The Authors review and analyze the five proposals through the
lenses of a German lawyer-scholar (Grunewald) and an American
socio-legal scholar of wrongful convictions (Zalman), while exploring
the adversarial or inquisitorial nature of the proposals. Part II begins
by summarizing the proposals. It becomes quickly apparent that some
of the proposals’ elements bear a resemblance to the “inquisitorial”
adjudicatory systems of continental Europe. In Part III, we describe
aspects of contemporary European criminal procedure, concentrating
on German law and practice as a backdrop for analyzing the propos-
als. This Part examines three attributes of contemporary continental
inquisitorial process: the idea of the impartial investigation, the degree
to which defendants’ rights are protected, and judicial dominance of
the trial. Part IV analyzes various components of the five reform pro-
posals for their novelty, feasibility, complexity, likely impact, and pos-
sible negative or positive side effects. Part V concludes by briefly
adding to the discussion our views advocating serious consideration of
modest truth-enhancing procedural reforms. Given the complexity,
embeddedness, and value-laden aspects of the trial process, advocat-
ing any modifications is a hard sell, and proposing changes that go to
its core border on heresy. Yet we believe that the problems that stimu-
lated the five proposals are sufficiently serious to call for reappraisal,
further discussion, and carefully thought-out changes in trial
procedures.
The Authors issue a disclaimer at the outset. Although this analysis
evaluates the reform proposals in light of continental law and practice,
it does not intend to criticize the proposals for not living up to some
kind of idealized inquisitorial standard. For one thing, it is not entirely
clear that European criminal justice systems are less prone to wrong-
ful convictions than common law nations.18 More relevant, however, is
that the proposals’ authors did not set out to emulate the German, or
French, or some idealized version of an inquisitorial system. Risin-
ger,19 for example, does not mention continental procedure and draws
18. Rolf Eschelbach, a judge at the Federal Court of Justice, estimates (without
statistical support) that probably more than 25% of all felony convictions in Germany
are wrongful. Rolf Eschelbach, StPO § 261 Rn. 63–63.2, BECK’SCHER ONLINE-KOM-
MENTAR STPO (Feb. 1, 2012), https://beck-online.beck.de/default.aspx?vpath=bibdata
/komm/BeckOK_StPO_13/StPO/cont/beckok.StPO.p261.glG.glIII.gl2.htm [http://
perma.cc/9WQA-ZTSK] (Ger.). However, Klaus Tolksdorf, former President of the
Federal Court of Justice, criticizes a similar estimate of Eschelbach for being method-
ologically problematic. Stefan Geiger, Interview zu Fehlurteilen: “Kein Mensch wu¨rde
Richter,” STUTTGARTER-ZEITUNG.DE (Nov. 4, 2012, 4:05 PM), http://www.stuttgarter-
zeitung.de/inhalt.interview-zu-fehlurteilen-kein-mensch-wuerde-richter.16065407-
e8a5-4097-bc7a-17c455f1f010.html [http://perma.cc/NJW5-3G84] (Ger.).
19. A note on style: Throughout this Article the Authors use the names of the
cited authors as metonyms for their articles. Thus, for example, Risinger, standing
alone is, in context, a stand-in for Risinger’s model or Risinger’s proposal cited in
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on English criminal procedure as a guide to appellate standards.20
Findley, while discussing aspects of continental procedure, creates an
entirely novel reform model.21 Although Bakken describes his model
as inquisitorial, on inspection it is more a reengineering of the Ameri-
can trial process.22 Gross creates a judge-controlled process, thus in-
troducing a continental attribute to his model. Yet while displaying an
awareness of European procedure, Gross does not emulate it, and his
proposal fastens on the realities of American criminal and civil proce-
dure.23 Slobogin draws more heavily on continental procedure than
the other authors and relates each reform element to European prac-
tice; but throughout, his major concern is estimating the workability
and constitutionality of his reforms.24 It is fair to say that the propos-
als were not driven by comparativist goals but by considerations of the
error-producing potential of the American trial process and by con-
ceiving of ways to change pre-trial and trial procedures to reduce er-
ror. Nevertheless, because each proposal recommends trial-system
changes that move toward inquisitorial modes (even if not directly
borrowed from continental procedure), we believe that a comparison
with continental procedure will help advance the broader discussion
about “reinventing the trial.”25
II. FIVE TRIAL-MODIFICATION PROPOSALS
Given the substantial attention that legal scholars pay to miscar-
riages of justice,26 it is no surprise that scholars have begun to address
the trial as a source of error and have begun to modify it to generate
more accurate decisions.27 The first accuracy-promoting trial innova-
tion procedure we review, by D. Michael Risinger, sought to re-con-
ceptualize criminal trial procedures depending on the nature of the
issue and the evidence in the case.28 Four years later, Tim Bakken
footnote 1. One benefit of this approach is to reduce excessive and unnecessary
footnotes.
20. See infra Part II, Section A.
21. See infra Part II, Section D.
22. See infra Part II, Section B.
23. See infra Part II, Section C.
24. See infra Part II, Section E.
25. Borrowing from Germany’s inquisitorial system would be easier than borrow-
ing from other inquisitorial systems, such as that of the French, because of the Ger-
man system’s greater relative similarity to the American criminal justice system.
Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to Ameri-
can Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
317, 318 (1995).
26. At least thirty-nine law review symposia on wrongful conviction topics have
been published since 2001. See Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
1549, 1550 (2008) (counting twelve as of its publication in 2008). Since 2010/2011, the
Albany Law Review has published an annual symposium on miscarriages of justice. A
list of these symposia is available from the Authors.
27. See GARRETT, supra note 9, at 145–77.
28. Risinger, supra note 1.
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proposed a modified adversary system trial that was more elaborate
than, but conceptually similar to, Risinger’s.29 In 2010, Tim Bakken
and Lewis Steele organized a symposium at New York Law School,
producing a law review issue on innocence reform entitled Exonerat-
ing the Innocent: Pretrial Innocence Procedures.30 We selected for
analysis two articles proposing novel trial procedures by Keith Findley
and Samuel Gross from that symposium. Slobogin’s31 essay was
previewed at a 2013 University of Southern California Law School
conference and referenced the New York Law School Law Review
symposium.
Our choice of the five proposals selected for analysis is somewhat
arbitrary and dictated in part by their focus on trial and pre-trial
processes. Other articles in the New York Law School Law Review
symposium offer interesting ideas for additional structural innovations
that, if adopted, might create a trial and justice system more fully
committed to error reduction.32 Thus, Risinger and his multi-issue
study proposed greater judicial supervision over police investigation;
radical restructuring of the police by separating the patrol and detec-
tive functions; deposition procedures for evidence gathering; and re-
forms of interrogation, eyewitness identification, and mug shot
procedures.33 Other articles include: Griffin’s encyclopedic proposal
29. Bakken, supra note 1. Bakken came upon Risinger’s proposal after completing
his own. Id. at 552 n.15. Simultaneous or multiple discovery in the sciences signal that
scientific work has reached a rich stage, attracting the attention of many scholars and
making new discoveries likely. The growing sense among legal scholars that the
American trial needs rethinking may parallel what was viewed as a “coming crisis” in
the forensic sciences in the 2000s, which led to the 2009 National Research Council’s
report and the creation of the National Commission on Forensic Science in 2013. See
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A PATH FORWARD (Nat’l Academies Press 2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdf-
files1/nij/grants/228091.pdf [http://perma.cc/5VBU-FJAN]; Carmen Drahl & Andrea
Widener, Forcing Change in Forensic Science, CHEM. & ENG’G NEWS, May 12, 2014,
at 10, http://cen.acs.org/content/dam/cen/92/19/09219-cover.pdf [http://perma.cc/
KXD6-NMLP]; Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift
in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892 (2005); see also Simon A. Cole,
The Innocence Crisis and Forensic Science Reform, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 167 (Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano
eds., Routledge 2014); Jennifer E. Laurin, Remapping the Path Forward: Toward a
Systematic View of Forensic Science Reform and Oversight, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1051
(2013).
30. Tim Bakken & Lewis M. Steel, Exonerating the Innocent: Pretrial Innocence
Procedures, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 825 (2011/2012); see Tim Bakken, Models of Jus-
tice to Protect Innocent Persons, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 837 (2011/2012) [hereinafter
Bakken, Models of Justice].
31. Slobogin, supra note 1.
32. Tim Bakken described these articles in some detail and critiqued them in Bak-
ken, Models of Justice, supra note 30.
33. D. Michael Risinger & Lesley C. Risinger, Innocence Is Different: Taking In-
nocence into Account in Reforming Criminal Procedure, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 869
(2011/2012) (incorporating Risinger, supra note 1 (reviewed infra Part II, Section A)).
In a private correspondence D. Michael Risinger noted that Innocence Is Different
was intended to supersede Unsafe Verdicts. Email from Prof. D. Michael Risinger to
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for prosecutorial disclosure of evidence;34 proposals by Blume, John-
son, and Miller for special awareness and procedures to protect
against wrongfully convicting mentally retarded defendants;35 Ware’s
description of the prosecutor’s conviction integrity unit;36 and propos-
als by Cassell—somewhat of an innocence-skeptic—for truth-enhanc-
ing practices.37 We do not analyze for comparison specific proposals in
Kent Roach’s sweeping study of “adversarial and inquisitorial
themes,” in part because of its Canadian focus, but we do draw on his
astute insights in our analysis.38
Our summary of the five truth-oriented trial procedure proposals
we selected imposes a structure on them that the authors may not
have intended. Readers should be forewarned that we listed and ar-
ranged elements of the proposals for the sake of clarity but that, in so
doing, we have stripped away some of the textual analysis and nuance
that offers more complete explanations.
Dr. Marvin Zalman (July 24, 2015) (on file with Authors). Several topics in Innocence
Is Different went beyond the focus on pre-trial and trial procedures, and retaining
Unsafe Verdicts exemplifies its originality at an earlier point in the innocence
movement.
34. Lissa Griffin, Pretrial Procedures for Innocent People: Reforming Brady, 56
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 969 (2011/2012).
35. John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Susan E. Millor, Convicting Lennie:
Mental Retardation, Wrongful Convictions, and the Right to a Fair Trial, 56 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 943 (2011/2012).
36. Mike Ware, Dallas County Conviction Integrity Unit and the Importance of
Getting It Right the First Time, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1033 (2011/2012).
37. Paul G. Cassell, Freeing the Guilty Without Protecting the Innocent: Some
Skeptical Observations on Proposed New “Innocence” Procedures, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 1063, 1080–95 (2011/2012) (proposing: (1) researching wrongful conviction
causes; (2) experimenting with allowing a waiver of rights in return for raising post-
conviction innocence claims (borrowing from Gross, supra note 1); (3) strictly imple-
menting evidence disclosure under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (4) increas-
ing defense and prosecutor resources; (5) abolishing the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule; (6) replacing Miranda warnings with videotaped interrogations; (7)
eliminating state habeas corpus in some circumstances; and (8) requiring defense at-
torneys to inquire into clients’ claims of innocence).
38. Kent Roach, Wrongful Convictions: Adversarial and Inquisitorial Themes, 35
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 387 (2010). Roach also reviewed proposals cited here.
Id. at 426 (reviewing Frase & Weigend, supra note 25, at 342; GEORGE C. THOMAS
III, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: HOW THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM SACRI-
FICES INNOCENT DEFENDANTS 193–207 (Univ. of Mich. Press 2008)). A canvass of
comparative legal scholarship would likely generate many other worthy works. See,
e.g., Findley, supra note 1, at 914 n.10, 931 n.108; Slobogin, supra note 1, at 712–13
n.60. See generally Slobogin, supra note 1, at 710–13 (writing a section entitled, “Em-
pirically Comparing Adversarialism and Inquisitorialism”).
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A. Risinger—Factual Innocence Trial Rules & Unsafe Verdicts
(2004)
Michael Risinger’s model arose out of a concern with wrongful con-
victions,39 his rethinking of earlier critiques of Robert Burns’ enthusi-
asm for the adversary trial,40 and the majority decision in Old Chief v.
United States.41 Old Chief, in a radical departure from earlier standard
rationalist evidence doctrine, expanded the meaning of an admissible,
relevant “fact that is of consequence to the determination of” the
case42 in the context of a judge limiting relevant evidence that is out-
weighed by its potential to prejudice the mind of the jury:
Thus, the prosecution may fairly seek to place its evidence before
the jurors, as much to tell a story of guiltiness as to support an infer-
ence of guilt, to convince the jurors that a guilty verdict would be
morally reasonable as much as to point to the discrete elements of a
defendant’s legal fault.43
To Risinger, the Court’s allowance was a shocking departure from
standard rationalist theory; but it also acknowledged that, in practice,
prosecutors are allowed to introduce evidence that colors the case
with a pro-prosecutor moral flavor and fervor even though such prac-
tice does “violence to the rationalist model” of evidence.44 He labeled
such emotion-generating evidence as “heartstrings and gore” evi-
dence. In his rethinking, however, he came to appreciate the jury’s
value-laden, possibly emotional evaluations, but only in certain kinds
of cases.
The key to Risinger’s rethinking and to his proposal is an insight
that divides criminal prosecutions into two classes. In the first class,
external facts are known (the defendant without doubt performed the
criminal act) and the jury must determine the defendant’s state of
mind. In the second class, the jury must decide whether a knowable
external fact occurred or is true. The “main impact of . . . emotionally
gripping horror-of-the-crime evidence . . . is to lower the jury’s func-
tional standard of what constitutes a reasonable doubt,”45 shifting the
inquiry from reasonable doubt of guilt to propensity. On reflection,
Risinger thought that a cross-sectional jury’s group decision-making
might be better suited to state-of-mind decisions, which depend on the
39. Risinger, supra note 1, at 1282–83 (“[C]laims of actual innocence in fact
(strictly defined) possess a moral purchase far superior to other moral claims that
animate the legal process.”).
40. Id. at 1288–89 & n.34 (reconsidering ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE
TRIAL (Princeton Univ. Press 1999); WILLIAM L. TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE:
EXPLORATORY ESSAYS (Nw. Univ. Press 1994).
41. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174–92 (1997).
42. See FED. R. EVID. 401.
43. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 188.
44. Risinger, supra note 1, at 1301.
45. Id. at 1306.
198 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3
jury’s “empathetic projection” into the mind of a defendant.46 In such
case, the “range of potential subjective accounts is very great.”47 It is
equally important that such decisions are made in contextually rich
environments that involve thick descriptions of the social milieu in
which the events transpired, all of which are beyond succinct descrip-
tion.48 Risinger labels these “polyvalent and normatively charged” is-
sues,49 which are well suited to trials where lawyers employ story-
telling techniques, resulting in the kind of normative decisions found
in jury verdicts that reflect the common sense and ethics of the com-
munity.50 Such verdicts are not inevitably correct, but judgment errors
in cases like this do not rise to the same level of moral revulsion that
greets “wrong person” or “no-crime” wrongful convictions.51
The second class of cases involves “binary-valued issues of actual
fact” where the decision is whether a particular fact occurred.52 These
“are the kinds of decisions where ordinary juries can most often be led
to miscarry by adversary excess, especially in the context of high pro-
file and highly dramatic cases.”53 Such cases require “special rules to
rein in partisan excess and more tightly structure the trial.”54 To ad-
dress these cases, Risinger suggested a “mechanism that matches pro-
cedures to cases,” depending on whether the nature of issues in
criminal cases involves polyvalent or binary-fact determinations.55 A
judge would determine whether to utilize normal trial procedures
where polyvalent facts characterize the case or to employ special trial
procedures for claims of factual innocence. We summarize Risinger’s
special factual innocence procedures:56
(1) Gaining access to factual innocence procedures would require
the defendant to “isolate the one (or perhaps two) binary exterior ulti-
mate facts that underlie his claim of innocence.”57 The prosecution
can argue against the motion, leaving the decision whether to conduct
a “binary fact” trial in the hands of the judge.58
46. Id. at 1306–07.
47. Id. at 1294.
48. Id. at 1295.
49. Id. at 1311.
50. Id. at 1297–98, 1308–09; see also SAM SCHRAGER, THE TRIAL LAWYER’S ART
(Temple Univ. Press 1999) (regarding lawyers’ storytelling technique); D. GRAHAM
BURNETT, A TRIAL BY JURY (Knopf 2001) (providing a juror’s account of a trial).
51. Risinger, supra note 1, at 1298–1300.
52. Id. at 1295–1307.
53. Id. at 1309.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1307.
56. Here, as in our summary of the other authors’ proposals, the numbering of
those authors’ points are those of the Authors, designed to allow cross-referencing.
57. Risinger, supra note 1, at 1311.
58. Id. at 1311–12. The defense motion requirement gives the defendant a “spe-
cific pleading option” functioning “as a kind of special pleading” which requires judi-
cial approval. Id. at 1312.
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(2) The court tightly controls the evidence introduced at trial from
both sides, limited to that which is usably relevant to the factual is-
sues.59 The “notion of usable relevance . . . takes account of the capac-
ities of the jury as well as the content of the information.”60 Although
not all narrative context information is to be eliminated, the goal is to
“squeeze out inflammatory proffers, especially of the ‘heartstrings and
gore’ variety.”61 The evidence should be “relevant to the defined fac-
tual claims of actual innocence.”62
(3) The court would closely screen expert witnesses for reliability.
(3a) “[A]ny defense-proffered expert evidence on the weaknesses
of eyewitness identification, false confessions, the commonness of
false testimony by jailhouse snitches, and the weaknesses of any ex-
pert evidence proffered by the prosecution” could not be excluded
“on grounds that it ‘invades the province of the jury.’”63 Excluding
such expert witnesses “is misplaced whenever the testimony seeks to
educate the jury about counterintuitive facts that are well supported
by research and the jurors may not know from their general back-
ground experience.”64
(3b) Prosecution-proffered expertise is screened according to “stan-
dards of reliability and applicable standards of proof”65 that depend
on the context. In an earlier article, Risinger worked out a rough
guide of admissibility standards under Kumho Tire. His admittedly in-
complete taxonomy included the following guidelines:
• All things being equal, the higher the standard of proof applica-
ble to the issue upon which the expertise is offered, the higher
the required threshold of dependability should be.
• High standards should apply to pure fact issues, and extremely
high standards to prosecution expertise bearing on pure fact is-
sues in criminal cases, such as identity or the existence of the
actus reus.66
(4) The defendant retains the right to silence.67
59. Id. at 1311–13.
60. Id. at 1312.
61. Id. at 1313.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1311–13.
64. Id. at 1313.
65. Id.
66. D. Michael Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional Taxonomy of Ex-
pertise for the Post-Kumho World, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 508, 536 (2000).
67. See Risinger, supra note 1, at 1312 n.157. Risinger considered requiring de-
fendants who chose factual innocence procedures to testify before a magistrate and
excluding prior convictions for impeachment. Id. (“Although these or other such pro-
posals might actually increase the system’s ‘resolving power’ in regard to claims of
actual innocence, I ultimately concluded that they would only get in the way of a fair
consideration of the need for some provision of special procedures for factual inno-
cence claims.”); see also id. at 1304 n.120 and accompanying text.
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(5) “Closing arguments would be expected to stick closely to the
factual issues raised in the application.”68
(6) “The cross-sectional jury would be retained, together with the
finality rule for acquittals.”69
(7) “Convictions would be reviewable not merely on the basis of
sufficiency, but also on the issue of whether they were ‘unsafe’”—the
English standard of review.70 “Adoption of the unsafe verdict ground
would correct a number of defects in the current unsatisfactory role of
courts in protecting the factually innocent,”71 upending the American
tradition of extreme appellate deference to jury verdicts.72
B. Bakken—Innocence Procedures (2008)
Tim Bakken’s intricately balanced proposal would change “the
structure of the system so that defendants asserting innocence can
compel the government and courts to search for truth” by introducing
“innocence procedures” while leaving the traditional trial and plea
bargaining process in place.73 These are necessary because: (i) the rea-
sonable doubt standard tolerates error; (ii) there is no method in the
process to determine innocence or compel the government to “more
thorough[ly] search for accuracy;”74 (iii) fact-eliminating procedures
populate the adversary system;75 and (iv) post-conviction review is
inadequate.76
The main features of Bakken’s innocence procedures are as follows:
(1) A defendant may enter a plea of innocence rather than not
guilty, under rules established to allow such a plea.77
(2) “[D]efense attorneys would have to file an affidavit or affirma-
tion indicating that upon information, belief, and investigation their
clients’ claims of innocence are true” in order for defendants to in-
voke the innocence procedures.78 An attorney could file an innocence
affirmation for “incompetent” defendants who “might not know they
are factually innocent” based on good faith investigation.79
68. Id. at 1312.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 1313–33 (describing the standard of appellate review of criminal con-
victions established by the Criminal Appeal Act of 1966, which allows the Court of
Appeals, Criminal Division to quash a conviction or order a retrial when in light of
new or fresh evidence the verdict of guilt was unsafe and unsatisfactory).
71. Id. at 1315–16.
72. Risinger criticizes the way in which English courts narrowed the applicability
of the unsafe verdict standard. Id. at 1316–21.
73. Bakken, supra note 1, at 549, 561.
74. See id. at 555.
75. Id. at 556.
76. Id. at 557–58.
77. Id. at 561.
78. Id. at 568 (modeling procedures after FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a) (regarding guilty
pleas)). But see Risinger & Risinger, Innocence is Different, supra note 33, at 893 n.71.
79. Bakken, supra note 1, at 570.
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(3) The defendant is obliged “to submit to questioning and to reveal
some communications with his attorney”80 that would “reveal[ ] virtu-
ally his entire defense,”81 specifically waiving his or her:
(3a) “Fifth Amendment right to remain silent,”82 and
(3b) “Sixth Amendment right to some confidential communications
with an attorney.”83
(4) The innocence plea “would trigger pre-trial investigations that
focus on determining the truth of the defendant’s innocence claim
rather than on collecting evidence sufficient to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.”84 This converts the justice process “from an adver-
sarial contest to an inquisitorial inquiry.”85
How the state would marshal its investigatory resources to accom-
plish this end is not specified. We assume that a legislated system al-
lowing the plea of innocence would be accompanied by rules and
budget allocations to concentrate investigatory resources on factual
innocence investigations that “do[] not implicate any question of law
and [are] not dependent directly on the fact finder’s application of law
to facts.”86 This flows from Bakken’s assertion of “at least two types
of factual innocence”87 (similar to Risinger’s two types). The first type
“involves a factual dispute to which the fact-finder must apply a legal
rule,”88 such as deciding a self-defense claim. Innocence procedures
are less applicable to this type of factual innocence claim because
when jurors err by “misapply[ing] the law to the facts presented and
engage in faulty or inaccurate mental judgments, convicted defendants
will find it virtually impossible to overturn the resulting guilty
verdicts.”89
Bakken’s second type of factual innocence which, following Risin-
ger, we call pure factual disputes, comprises essentially wrong-person
cases. This kind of case “does not implicate any question of law and is
not dependent directly on the fact-finder’s application of law to facts.
Every reasonable person viewing the universally objective facts in this
type of case would always conclude that the defendant is innocent.”90
80. Id. at 567.
81. Id. at 549.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 561. Earlier in the article, Bakken states that innocent pleas would re-
quire prosecutors, “absent a compelling justification, to faithfully investigate the truth
of defendants’ innocence claims, as opposed to focusing on determining whether guilt
can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 549.
85. Id. at 561–62.
86. Id. at 554.
87. Id. at 553.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 554.
90. Id. The proposals made by Bakken and Risinger, focusing as they do on
“pure” or “binary” factual disputes, may be difficult to apply to “no crime” wrongful
convictions, such as erroneous “shaken baby syndrome” convictions where expert
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For such pure factual disputes, the “main purpose of innocence proce-
dures is to induce the government to conduct an enhanced pre-trial
investigation” coupled with a general obligation not to “pursue cases
that might normally proceed to trial without an enhanced
investigation.”91
Bakken anticipated that after an enhanced investigation, prosecu-
tors would dismiss some cases on grounds of innocence but would not
be convinced in other cases and would proceed to trial. The main pro-
tection for innocent defendants who have waived certain rights but
are nevertheless subject to trial after an innocence investigation con-
sists of trial rights and presumptions. The trial rights are also designed
to level the playing field if the prosecution does “not faithfully initiate
or complete an investigation.”92
(5) In order to protect these rights, the following innocence proce-
dures would put pressure on prosecutors to play fair:
(5a) “The government would be required to prove guilt to a higher
standard than beyond a reasonable doubt.”93 The heightened burden
of proof is designed to offset the government’s advantage in having
obtained evidence in the defendant’s possession. The burden could be
couched in terms of guilt “to a moral certainty” or “beyond all reason-
able doubt.”94
(5b) “Jurors could infer innocence from an innocent plea.”95
(5c) “Jurors could draw inferences favorable to the defendant from
the defendant’s prompt claim of innocence.”96 Indeed, “[j]udges
should instruct jurors that they may draw inferences favorable to de-
fendants who claim innocence” and waive various rights.97
(5d) “Jurors could presume that evidence and leads presented by
the defendant but not pursued by the government would have been
favorable to the defendant.”98
opinions may be in conflict or faulty fire investigations that inflate accidental fires into
arsons. See JOHN J. LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS FOR FIRE INVESTIGATION (2d
ed., CRC Press 2013); DEBORAH TUERKHEIMER, FLAWED CONVICTIONS: “SHAKEN
BABY SYNDROME” AND THE INERTIA OF INJUSTICE (Oxford Univ. Press 2014).
Neither Risinger nor Bakken distinguished between “wrong person” and “no crime”
wrongful convictions. The difficulty of applying their special trial processes to “no
crime” cases seems not to apply to Gross, Findley, or Slobogin. For statistics distin-
guishing between “wrong person” and “no crime” case, see NAT’L REGISTRY OF EX-
ONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2014, 3 (2015), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2014_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/R887-
QCFD].
91. Bakken, supra note 1, at 572.
92. Id. at 573.
93. Id. at 549.
94. Id. at 574.
95. Id. at 549.
96. Id. at 550.
97. Id. at 575.
98. Id. at 550.
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(5e) “Jurors could acquit the defendant upon finding that the gov-
ernment acted in bad faith.”99 An example is when “the government
does not assist in investigating innocence” or does “not conduct a suf-
ficient investigation” from evidence obtained from the defendant.100
(5f) “[I]nnocence [trial] procedures should provide defendants with
the right to block evidence the government obtains in violation of its
innocence obligations. . . .”101
(5g) “Innocence [trial] procedures would mandate a jury instruction
on the prosecution’s lack of investigation.”102
In sum, the central premise of Bakken’s proposal is that “the gov-
ernment and courts search for truth as the primary means to free in-
nocent persons.”103
C. Gross—Investigative Trial (2011–2012)
Samuel Gross began by analyzing the innocent defendant’s di-
lemma of pleading guilty or facing a draconian sentence and a ponder-
ous appellate process if found guilty at trial. Investigative trials,
ideally “open-minded judge-led inquiries into the facts of contested
prosecutions,”104 involve tradeoffs. Curiously, a defendant found
guilty following the investigative trial would benefit from procedural
gains:
(i) the right to reopen the question of his guilt if he presents sub-
stantial new evidence that casts doubt on his conviction and (ii) the
right to a retrial if, at that review proceeding, a de novo assessment
of all the evidence leads to the conclusion that there is a substantial
doubt that he is guilty.105
In return, the defendant gives up the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule.106
99. Id. Were this to occur, it would make determining whether such a defendant
were factually innocent or exonerated on procedural grounds difficult.
100. Id. at 576.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 577.
103. Id. at 553.
104. Gross, supra note 1, at 1029.
105. Id. at 1023.
106. Id. The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, requiring that unconstitution-
ally seized evidence be excluded from consideration at trial, was established as a con-
stitutional rule for federal prosecutions in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914),
and as such extended to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 387 U.S. 643 (1961). As one of the
most controversial topics of constitutional criminal procedure, its status as a constitu-
tional rule was “demoted” from a personal right to a device to protect Fourth Amend-
ment rights by deterring police from conducting illegal searches and seizures. See
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974). The constitutional status of the rule remains a closely contested issue. See
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
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Gross proposed and analyzed several procedures and rules that
would make an investigative trial feasible, which he judiciously la-
beled “open questions.”107
(1) Sentence. For the scheme to work, the “trial penalty” paid by
defendants who opted for the investigative trial and were found guilty
would have to be “intermediate,” between the current plea bargain
going rate and the trial penalty for opting for a trial absent the investi-
gative trial.108 Although we will not bog down this critical point with
further speculation, a fully-fledged thought experiment would require
more analysis of this issue.
(2) Guilty pleas. Gross would allow a defendant who opted for an
investigative trial to change his mind and plead guilty, but the defen-
dant would not get the benefit of the lower sentence had he initially
pleaded guilty. Instead, the defendant would receive the intermediate
investigative trial sentence but would not receive the appellate process
benefits for entering a guilty plea after opting and dropping the inves-
tigative trial option.109
(3) Defendant waives the right to silence. This does not require sub-
mission to police interrogation; but the defendant must “answer pre-
trial questions from state officials in the presence of his attorney,
possibly under oath, and will be required to testify at trial.”110
(4) Defendant waives objection to evidence seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Silence and the exclusion of illegally seized evi-
dence “limit the accuracy of fact finding in favor of other interests.”111
(5) Other possible waivers. Waivers of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel “should be off the table,” but Gross would consider some
limited waivers of the double-jeopardy prohibition.112
(6) Discovery. Open—but not unlimited—discovery is a central fea-
ture of the investigative trial. “[S]ome confidential information has to
be protected, and the burden of the process should be minimized.”113
(7) Trial structure and process. If the defendant waives trial by jury,
the trial may be conducted by a judge without a jury, not in one sitting
but “as a series of discreet hearings.”114 The first consequence is that
exclusionary rules designed to avoid contaminating the decision of the
lay jury are set aside.115 Controversial evidence may be allowed, and
107. Gross, supra note 1, at 1024–27.
108. Id. at 1024–25.
109. Id. at 1025. Gross leaves unanswered the question of whether actual trial
sentences, the “going rate” sentences for pleading guilty, and some intermediate
sentences are known with sufficient certainty to sustain an investigative trial system.
110. Id. at 1024; see also Risinger & Risinger, Innocence is Different, supra note 33,
at 878–85 (proposing a system resembling historical judicial roles).
111. Gross, supra note 1, at 1023; accord Findley, supra note 1, at 917.
112. Gross, supra note 1, at 1025.
113. Id. at 1026.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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the procedure then delayed to “give the opposing party time to do
what it can to explain it or contradict it.”116 Second, such a continuing
process “reduces the distinction between trial and discovery.”117 With
time to address and respond to negative evidence, each party has less
need to provide advance notice of the evidence in its possession. This
model is not set in stone and “could take many forms.”118
(8) Post-conviction review. One trade-off benefitting “a defendant
who is convicted at an investigative trial” is the “right to reopen the
case if he presents substantial new evidence of innocence; and that,
once reopened, he would have the right to a new trial if that new
evidence casts substantial doubt on his guilt.”119
(9) Legal culture and personnel; the role of the judge. A major rea-
son why the proposed model may not work is the professional conser-
vatism of legal professionals, with prosecutors viewing the
investigative trial as “an obstacle to convicting . . . the guilty” and
defense attorneys viewing it as a “slow guilty plea without the benefit
of a bargain.”120 Nevertheless, their roles would not fundamentally
change.121 The more radical change is to the role of judges, who would
have to adopt the new function of “leading judicial investigations” ef-
fectively.122 “Our legal culture does not include the role of an investi-
gative judge.”123 As ex-litigators with no special judicial training and a
belief in attorney-dominated trials, judges in investigative trials might
not be up to taking more active roles in raising and defining issues,
examining witnesses, or occasionally calling witnesses.124
Gross’s concluding thoughts are: first, such trials “would not be a
common choice” in part because defense attorneys might convince in-
nocent clients to avoid them, fearing the consequence of waived
rights; second, most investigative trials will be resolved without ver-
dicts, leading to dismissals or guilty pleas; and third, the waiver of con-
stitutional rights might raise defense attorney and civil libertarian
opposition.125 Were the investigative trial to become the norm, it
could improve defendants’ civil liberties, “which are routinely com-
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1026–27.
118. Id. Again, Gross offers a sketch, not a completely fleshed out work. The trial
process resembles some civil bench trials.
119. Id. at 1027.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1028.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. If few investigative trials were held, it might be possible to find judges who
have an inquisitorial bent to conduct them. The success of this proposal may hinge
upon finding such judges, just as the success of problem-solving courts, such as drug
courts, depends in part on locating judges with more “social work” orientations. See
GREG BERMAN, REDUCING CRIME, REDUCING INCARCERATION: ESSAYS ON CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE INNOVATION 57, 63, 72–74 (Quid Pro Quo Books 2014).
125. Gross, supra note 1, at 1028–29.
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promised or ignored in the mass of plea bargains.”126 Although not
perfect, investigative trials “will lead to better and more accu-
rate . . . results, before trial and at trial.”127 Finally, Gross opines that,
although defendants may be attracted to investigative trials at first be-
cause of the trial-court process, the value of the post-conviction bene-
fits will become apparent over time.128
D. Findley—Adversarial Inquisitions: Office of Public Advocacy
(2011–2012)
An adversary system “so compromised by imbalance between the
parties” and rife with wrongful convictions has led some observers “to
think about ways to redesign the search for the truth.”129 In Keith
Findley’s Office of Public Advocacy (“OPA”), “lawyers alternate be-
tween acting as prosecutors and as defense attorneys, and . . . both the
adversarial prosecutor and defense attorney share in guiding the in-
quisitorial process of investigating the case and developing the evi-
dence.”130 Instead of “tweaking” the existing adversary system,131
Findley—after reviewing reasons why changes to the present system
will not achieve the goal of better ascertaining the truth,132 and after
considering the risks of importing a pure inquisitorial system into ex-
isting American institutions133—opts instead for a hybrid system.
“[T]he best procedure is one that attempts to harness the best aspects
of both [adversarial and inquisitorial] procedures, while minimizing
the weaknesses of each.”134 The OPA is not simply an innocence op-
tion; any accused person “can choose whether to be prosecuted in the
traditional adversarial system or under” the new hybrid system.135
The process would work in the following way:
(1) The state would establish “an Office of Public Advocacy . . . that
would house both prosecutors and defense attorneys who rotate be-
tween those roles.”136 The rotation would result in the OPA attorneys
sharing perspectives and thereby “becom[ing] committed to the
search for the truth.”137 The OPA would not replace the traditional
adversary trial but would exist alongside it. The defendant would se-
126. Id. at 1028.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Findley, supra note 1, at 912. Findley also offers his own review and analysis of
proposals by Risinger and Bakken. Id. at 920–27.
130. Id. at 913.
131. Id. at 922.
132. Id. at 922–27.
133. Id. at 930–35.
134. Id. at 935.
135. Id. It is not clear who—the OPA or a “traditional” defense attorney—would
provide the accused with legal advice as to which system to choose. Lacking guidance,
the accused’s choice might depend on which kind of lawyer gets to him first.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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lect the system by which to be tried. This selection eliminates
problems associated with a plea of “innocence,” which implies guilt
for those who opt for the traditional “not guilty” plea.138
(2) “The defense lawyer . . . would remain adversarial and duty-
bound to zealously advocate for her client when assigned to that
role . . . .”139
(3) “In this new institution, the prosecutor and defense attorney
would then be tasked to work together, as joint inquisitors—adver-
sarial inquisitors, in a sense—to search for the truth and develop the
evidence in the case.”140 Thus, the defense attorney and the prosecu-
tor, also acting in an adversary role, would “jointly supervis[e] the
continuing investigation by police.”141 These procedures can bring
about a culture change by eroding the cognitive distortions (or “tun-
nel vision”) that develop when agents become too closely associated
with specific professional roles.142
(3a) “Police and forensic analysts would answer to both and would
be available to undertake investigations and analyses at the joint re-
quest of both.”143 As a result, “[i]nequalities in resources and access to
evidence would be muted, if not dissolved.”144 This system would also
create an atmosphere that makes it more likely that police will “inter-
nalize the search for innocence.”145
(4) “Witnesses would be interviewed jointly to guard against coach-
ing or manipulation by either side.”146
(5) The jury trial is retained in trials conducted by OPA attorneys,
and the jurors might not know whether the case was conducted under
OPA or traditional criminal procedure.147
(6) In OPA trials, the defendant waives conflict of interest claims.148
(7) The defendant does not “waive confidentiality of communica-
tions with counsel or the right to remain silent.”149
(8) The prosecutor’s file is fully disclosed to the defense.150 “And all
investigative reports, witness statements, laboratory reports—indeed,
all evidence in the case—would be equally available to both sides
(barring exceptional circumstances).”151
138. Id. at 936–37.
139. Id. at 935.
140. Id. at 936.
141. Id. at 935.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 936.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 938.
146. Id. at 939.
147. Id. at 937.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 937–38.
151. Id. at 939.
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(9) As noted above, alongside the OPA, “the traditional American
system” continues to exist,152 obviating the need for a special “inno-
cence plea.” The defendant initially pleads “not guilty,” as is done
now, and chooses the system (traditional or OPA) under which he or
she wishes to be tried.153
Findley believes that this system is immune from defense manipula-
tion because of its transparency; the shared-enterprise legal culture
would impose prohibitive costs for lawyers who violate the norms of
cooperation and “abuses could be taken to a judge for protective
orders.”154
E. Slobogin—A Hybrid Regime (2014)
Adverting to the possibility of wrongful acquittals as well as wrong-
ful convictions, Christopher Slobogin saw the need for an adjudication
system to better assess the truth. He laid the blame for a significant
portion of miscarriages of justice at the feet of excessive adversarial-
ism in the American trial process.155 Slobogin sought to retain some
features of the adversary system despite research (which could be
challenged) tending to show that “an adversarial system at its most
efficient is error-prone in a world of unequal resources.”156 He de-
fended his hybrid justice system proposal on the assumption that “in
the trial context the hybrid inquisitorial mode in which the disputants
can have their say is superior to the American-style adversarial model
at avoiding both wrongful verdicts and wrongful punishment, without
a significant sacrifice in subjective justice.”157
Slobogin advanced three proposals for a hybrid regime with the aim
of not only increasing verdict accuracy, but also ensuring that the pro-
posals would be deemed constitutional and would not create disas-
trous “cascading effects” or place undue new burdens on judges and
other trial participants.158 They are: (i) put the judge in charge of con-
ducting trial and plea-bargaining; (ii) limit expert witness adversarial-
152. Id. at 937.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 939. Findley’s alteration of the advocates’ roles should be read in tandem
with a thought-provoking exploration of how being an “innocence lawyer” has modi-
fied professional expectations by Michael Risinger and Lesley Risinger. See D.
Michael Risinger & Lesley C. Risinger, The Emerging Role of Innocence Lawyer and
the Need for Role-Differentiated Standards of Professional Conduct, in CONTROVER-
SIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 123 (Sarah Lucy Cooper ed., Ashgate 2014).
155. Slobogin, supra note 1, at 702–09.
156. Id. at 712–13.
157. Id. at 713. Unique among the proposals, Slobogin valorized the merits of pro-
cedural justice or subjective justice that has been supported in psychological research.
Id. at 710 n.46 (citing E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 3–4 (1988)).
158. Slobogin, supra note 1, at 716.
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ness by requiring court-appointed expert witnesses; and (iii) oblige the
defendant to offer unsworn testimony.159
(1) A judicial inquisition: The judicial obligation to discover the
truth.160
(1a) Rationale: “judicial questioning is likely to produce more
facts.”161
(1b) Rationale: witnesses “called by the judge rather than the par-
ties . . . will be less partisan.”162
(1c) Rationale: “the greater role of the judge could help redress the
imbalance that almost always exists between the state and
defendants.”163
(1d) Judge control does not violate the Sixth Amendment because
the “judge is simply added as another questioner,” as long as the judi-
cial examination is conducted “in a nonadversarial fashion,” and the
prosecutor and defense attorney are allowed to question.164
(1e) American judges are capable of leading trials but are not
trained to do so and “a fair and efficient judicial bureaucracy” as ex-
ists in Europe does not exist here.165 Nevertheless, “[m]oving in an
inquisitional direction would not require drastic changes to the cur-
rent American system” because European-like dossiers are “already
prepared in many United States jurisdictions[,]” and judges, as prior
litigators, can come up to speed with some training.166
(1f) Judicial control will provide six noteworthy benefits. It will
make plea bargaining more accurate by (i) requiring more intense ju-
dicial scrutiny of the facts;167 (ii) eliminating Alford pleas; (iii) under-
mining the effect of coercive deals under threat of severe trial-
penalties; (iv) weakening pressure to follow sentencing recommenda-
tions; and (v) limiting power of prosecutors to “condition pleas on
waivers of rights” (e.g., waivers of Brady claims).168 Finally, caseloads
will not become impossibly high because, as a result of these inquisito-
rial reforms, “many trials will resemble (leaner) sentencing hearings”
and shorter sentences will result in fewer appeals.169
(2) The expert’s obligation to remain neutral.170 The problem is that
“the adversarial process can undermine the objectivity of even the
159. Id.
160. Id. at 716–23.
161. Id. at 717.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 716–17.
164. Id. at 718–19.
165. Id. at 719.
166. Id. at 719–20.
167. Id. at 720.
168. Id. at 721.
169. Id. at 722–23.
170. Id. at 723–27.
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most cautious expert.”171 The response is to borrow the European sys-
tem where experts “are almost always court-appointed rather than se-
lected by the parties.”172
(2a) Because “inserting a judge into the investigative stage” will not
be adopted in America,173 the alternative will be a judicially enforced
rule “to prohibit coaching of experts.”174
(2b) Constitutional objections to such a rule, based on the right to
counsel and to have access to expert witnesses, can be defused by: (i)
providing detailed jury instructions based on established, consensus
scientific findings, or (ii) having experts with contrasting views sit to-
gether in court and allow cross-questioning.175
(3) The defendant’s obligation to testify at trial and at sentencing by
making unsworn statements.176
(3a) There are benefits of a witness’s unsworn testimony. First, it
provides the best evidence of the defendant’s actions and mindset,
which is especially instrumental in preventing guilty defendants from
being over-punished.177 Second, it reduces the incentives for police to
obtain confessions. And third, it contributes to subjective justice by
allowing the defendant to play a role in his or her case.178
(3b) Using defendants’ unsworn statements eliminates Fifth-
Amendment privilege-against-self-incrimination objections because
the statements “cannot be used to prosecute the defendant for
perjury.”179
(3c) The “defendant should not be impeachable with prior
offenses.”180
(3d) To avoid the Fifth Amendment objection that a defendant may
be required to speak before hearing the prosecutor’s evidence, “the
defendant could also be permitted to speak last, in contrast to the
usual European practice.”181
171. Id. at 723.
172. Id. at 724.
173. Id. at 725. Gross, to a degree, along with Risinger & Risinger, Innocence is
Different, appears to differ. See Gross, supra note 1, at 1024; Risinger & Risinger,
supra note 33, at 878–85.
174. Slobogin, supra note 1, at 725.
175. Id. An unauthorized version of “hot tubbing” occurred in the early days of the
DNA wars in the Castro case. See JAY D. ARONSON, GENETIC WITNESS: SCIENCE,
LAW, AND CONTROVERSY IN THE MAKING OF DNA PROFILING 70–72 (Rutgers Univ.
Press 2007).
176. Slobogin, supra note 1, at 727–30.
177. Id. at 727.
178. Id. at 728.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 730.
181. Id. at 728–29.
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(3e) A defendant speaking under such a regime does not run afoul
of Griffin v. California182 because the literal terms of its ruling simply
prevent prosecutors or judges from commenting on silence.183
(3f) The “defense should have full access to the prosecution’s dos-
sier, in order to better structure the defendant’s testimony.”184
F. Differences and Similarities
To assist in comparing the proposals, Table 1 provides a quick way
to compare the large number of differing and partially overlapping
proposals. The Table, of course, simplifies and “flattens” the authors’
models even more than our reduction of their proposals to numbered
items, so it should be used only as a starting point.
182. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
183. “Nonetheless, Griffin would probably have to be overturned to remove all
doubt on this point.” Slobogin, supra note 1, at 729.
184. Id. at 730.
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TABLE 1
REINVENTING THE TRIAL: SIMILARITIES AND
DIFFERENCES AMONG THE PROPOSALS
YES NO
1 Parallels standard trial Ris1 Bak Gro Fin Slo
procedure (vs. replacing it in
all cases)
2 Keep the jury? Ris Bak Fin Slo Gro
3 Judge Control? Gro Slo Ris2 Bak Fin
4 Change lawyers’ roles? Fin Slo Ris3 Bak4 Gro5
5 Concern with police Bak Fin Ris Gro Slo
investigation?
6 Innocence plea? Bak Ris Gro Fin Slo
7 Waiver of defendant’s rights? Bak Gro Slo Ris Fin6
8 Change evidence/trial practice Ris3 Bak Gro7 Slo Fin
rules?
9 Expert witness control? Ris Slo Bak Gro Fin
10 Discovery? Ris Bak Gro Fin Slo
11 Plea bargaining and guilty Gro Slo Ris Bak Fin
pleas a concern?
12 Sentence a concern? Gro Ris Bak Fin Slo8
13 Appeal, post-conviction Ris9 Gro Bak Fin Slo
review a concern?
14 Proposal explicitly or Bak10 Gro Slo11 Ris Fin11
distinctly inquisitorial or
hybrid?
Notes
1. “Ris” = Risinger, “Bak” = Bakken, “Gro” = Gross, “Fin” = Findley, “Slo” = Slobogin.
2. Risinger does not deem his judge inquisitorial but as having tighter control of evidence.
3. Risinger’s judge exercises tighter control over evidence and attorney’s questioning, but other than this, the
lawyers’ adversary roles are not affected.
4. Bakken’s defense attorney swears to client’s innocence but otherwise does not change role.
5. Despite judge control, Gross retains party presentation of evidence.
6. Findley requires a waiver of conflict-of-interest issues.
7. Gross eliminates the continuous trial and exclusionary rules designed to avoid contaminating lay jury
decisions.
8. Slobogin has the defendant’s testimony present the mindset at plea-taking, which may reduce over-
punishment.
9. Risinger adopts the English “safe verdict” standard.
10. Bakken claims that pre-trial investigations aimed at assessing the truth of innocence claims are
inquisitorial.
11. Slobogin and Findley describe their proposals as adversarial and inquisitorial system hybrids; in our judg-
ment, Slobogin has more of an inquisitorial nature than Findley.
Row 1 shows that four proposals are set up as procedures that stand
alongside the current trial process, whereas Slobogin’s proposal would
replace existing rules in all trials and plea-taking processes.
Rows 2 through 5 examine institutional roles. Row 2 shows that
only Gross eliminates the jury. Row 3 indicates that Gross and
Slobogin establish strong judge control. Whereas the judge’s ability to
control evidence and expert witnesses is somewhat higher in Risin-
ger’s model, the change is not as strong as it is with Gross and
Slobogin. Bakken’s model also implies greater judicial control than is
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now common, mostly by applying statutory presumptions. Findley
does not alter the role of judge or jury.
Row 4 indicates changes in lawyers’ roles. Findley’s centerpiece sug-
gests a major structural and cultural alteration by combining defense
lawyers and prosecutors into one agency and reversing their jobs peri-
odically. Slobogin creates a continental-style judge who leads off the
questioning of witnesses, although this is in the context of a jury trial
in which parties can ask questions and call witnesses. Although the
lawyer’s role is a bit fuzzy in Slobogin, on balance it should be
counted as a change, especially as expert witnesses are called by the
court. The same thinking might be applied to Gross, given his admoni-
tion that judges would lead judicial investigations. Yet party presenta-
tion of evidence, including lay and expert witnesses, is alive and well
in Gross’s model, putting his proposal on the “no change” side. Bak-
ken creates a series of presumptions and Risinger clamps down on the
ability of lawyers to try their cases in standard ways, but neither fun-
damentally changes the roles of prosecutors or defense attorneys.
Row 5 indicates that only Bakken and Findley gave some thought to
the role of police investigation.185
Rows 6 through 10 address issues of evidence and trial procedure.
Row 6 indicates that only Bakken requires the defendant to plead “in-
nocent.” This raises questions about the effect of innocence proce-
dures on ordinary trials. Row 7 notes that Bakken, Gross, and
Slobogin would have defendants waive constitutional rights, especially
the self-incrimination privilege. Findley emphatically endorses the re-
tention of defendants’ rights while Risinger considered but rejected
the waiver of rights in a manner similar to Slobogin.186 Row 8 indi-
cates that four proposals modify evidence rules and trial procedures,
while Findley—despite radically restructuring the prosecutor’s and de-
fense lawyer’s roles—appears to leave the trial process and rules of
evidence as-is. The many ways in which the other proposals modify
trial and evidence rules are not captured in Row 8. Row 9 indicates
that control over expert witnesses was an issue deemed sufficiently
important for Risinger and Slobogin to address specifically. The only
point of unanimity, seen in Row 10, is agreement on open discovery.
Rows 11 through 13 ask whether the proposals address the other
important—even critical—elements of the criminal procedure pro-
cess, including plea bargaining; sentencing; and appeals and post-con-
viction review. As the Table shows, Gross is mainly concerned with
the interaction of these institutions with a changed trial process.
185. For a detailed discussion of the control over police, see Risinger & Risinger,
Innocence is Different, supra note 33, at 890–906.
186. Risinger clarifies that he rejected waivers of rights “mostly on [the] practical
grounds” that to do so would detract from consideration of primary reforms. Email
from Prof. D. Michael Risinger to Dr. Marvin Zalman (July 24, 2015) (on file with
Authors).
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Slobogin’s judge control would probably have the greatest effect on
plea bargaining, with Gross a close second, suggesting that their pro-
posals would have the greatest potential impact on the justice system.
As for appeals (Row 13), Risinger looks to the English “safe verdict”
standard of review for appeals from his factual innocence trial proce-
dures, while Gross creates easier post-conviction review for defend-
ants who opted for the Investigative Trial.
Finally, although the proposals were not offered as comparative
scholarship, we ask whether they drew on or closely resembled ele-
ments of continental (inquisitorial) procedure in any way.187 Bakken,
Gross, Findley, and Slobogin explicitly reference inquisitorial systems.
In Row 14, we identify Slobogin and Gross as “inquisitorial” because
they create judge-controlled proceedings and include Bakken because
that proposal self-identifies as inquisitorial.188
With these features in mind, we next explore European law and
practice in order to compare the proposals to contemporary inquisito-
rial justice.
III. REFLECTIONS FROM A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE
In recent years, numerous authors have introduced a comparative
perspective into the wrongful conviction debate with a particular focus
on “inquisitorial” systems.189 Such systems have a stronger focus on
factual truth and appear to produce fewer wrongful convictions than
adversarial systems.190 “[I]nquisitorially inspired reforms,” suggested
187. Given the Table’s simplification of categories, and because of the lack of a
unified interpretation of the “inquisitorial,” the Authors broadly categorize proposals
that emphasize judge control or self-define as inquisitorial. Later, this Article will
look at inquisitorialness more closely and consider the proposals again.
188. All the proposals are tinged with elements of inquisitorialness. Risinger’s fac-
tual innocence procedures have inquisitorial elements of greater judge control over
the evidence, but evidence is still party-developed and presented. The inquisitorial
element in Bakken’s innocence procedures is an attempt to nudge police into en-
hanced investigation, although it respects the organizational separation of police from
the prosecution in state and local justice systems. Findley goes beyond Bakken in this
regard by having the prosecutor and defense attorney jointly supervise the police in-
vestigation and by having OPA lawyers adopt an inquisitorial attitude. Slobogin and
Gross establish judge-control.
189. See WRONGFUL CONVICTION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON MISCAR-
RIAGES OF JUSTICE, supra note 13; WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS & MISCARRIAGES OF
JUSTICE: CAUSES AND REMEDIES IN NORTH AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEMS (C. Ronald Huff & Martin Killias eds., Routledge 2013); Roach,
supra note 38; Frase & Weigend, supra note 25; Symposium, An International Explo-
ration of Wrongful Conviction, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 1067 (2012). The obverse literature
inspects the adversary system, partially in light of the inquisitorial. For an interesting
discussion and sources, see Mark P. Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire
and Expert Reliability: How the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34
SETON HALL L. REV. 15, 19–24 (2003).
190. Although fewer cases of wrongful convictions are reported and discussed in
the media in most inquisitorial countries, there is little to no data to back up a claim
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Kent Roach, might be able to prevent future wrongful convictions.191
Roach suggests that continental systems’ apparent willingness to re-
consider factual findings reveals the high value they place on discover-
ing truth above final dispute settlements and on “ensuring respect for
legal rights which seem to be the major concerns of adversarial sys-
tems.”192 While it is true that the American appellate process allows
only for a narrow and limited review of facts, it “is possible to layer
some features of a more neutral, inquisitorial system within the adver-
sarial framework.”193 It can be argued that innocence organizations194
have adopted what is the core of any inquisitorial system: a culture of
an unbiased investigation into a case. However, beyond specific bor-
rowings from European procedure, the idea behind the inquisitorial
has come to guide many reform proposals, including the ones we look
at.195 In any event, we proceed to explore the proposals through three
more-or-less inquisitorial concepts.
All the current reform models reflect inquisitorial ideas in one way
or another, either by explicitly borrowing them or by changing Ameri-
can procedures to be more “inquisitorial,” with the goal of improving
accuracy. We are aware that “[b]oth the adversarial and the inquisito-
rial systems are integrated systems. Each piece is affected and sup-
ported by every other piece. Transfer a piece without its support
system, and it will probably fail or distort some other features that you
didn’t intend to affect.”196 Criminal justice systems differ in much
more than the way truth is determined. Institutional culture, culture in
general, the historical and culturally accepted role of parties involved
in criminal proceedings, the interactions of agencies and personnel
within the criminal justice system, the standard of proof, sentencing
policies, lower or higher minimum and maximum sentences, appellate
procedures, and many other aspects can influence the likelihood of a
wrongful conviction. Transferring the “best” and avoiding the “weak-
est” parts from a system197 is difficult because of the challenge of de-
of lower wrongful conviction rates. A comparison would be difficult given the many
differences between the systems. The Authors proceed with that caveat in mind.
191. Roach, supra note 38, at 424.
192. Id. at 435.
193. Findley & Scott, supra note 4, at 372.
194. The Authors adopt this usage instead of the more familiar “innocence project”
because among Innocence Network member organizations, the original Innocence
Project affiliated with Cardozo law school is recognized as a legal entity with rights to
the name. Keith A. Findley & Larry Golden, The Innocence Movement, the Innocence
Network, and Policy Reform, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE RE-
FORM: MAKING JUSTICE 93, 94, 108 n.1 (Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano eds., Rout-
ledge 2014).
195. See Ralph Grunewald, The Role of Innocence Projects in American Criminal
Procedure 132 (Aug. 3, 2005) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, University of Wisconsin-
Madison) (on file with Authors).
196. Myron Moskovitz, The O.J. Inquisition: An American Encounter with Conti-
nental Criminal Justice, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1121, 1145 (1995).
197. Findley, supra note 1, at 935.
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termining which parts are functionally better than other parts. And all
parts of a system interact with each other and therefore limit isolated
analysis. But that does not mean a comparative analysis is futile—
quite the opposite. In acknowledging criminal justice systems as sys-
tems, we might be able to better understand what may work and what
will not.
The reform proposals, at least implicitly, share the optimistic out-
look that we can learn from inquisitorial systems, but they differ in
how they understand the inquisitorial. That is not surprising because a
common definition of what “the inquisitorial idea” means does not
exist and the understanding of how any given system implements the
idea of the inquisitorial varies widely.198 Inquisitorial systems are
often described as being non-accusatorial and the adversarial system
as being typically accusatorial.199 In fact, inquisitorial systems elimi-
nated a private accuser to varying degrees, but even early on in the
development of the inquisitorial process, a private and public accuser
could initiate proceedings.200 Today, for example, the German Staat-
sanwaltschaft (public prosecutor) prepares a public accusation (An-
klage) if a case should proceed to trial. But if the public prosecutor
does not intend to move forward, a private individual can (for specific
crimes) take the prosecutor’s role.201 Because accusatorial elements
exist in inquisitorial systems, we will not use the term “accusatorial”
to distinguish between adversarial and inquisitorial systems.
198. See Chrisje Brants, Wrongful Convictions and Inquisitorial Process: The Case
of the Netherlands, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 1069, 1074 (2012). For example, the German
system has been described as a neo-inquisitorial system because it equips the defense
with many rights and encourages attorneys to play an active role (while at the same
time, the whole process is still judge centered). See Frase & Weigend, supra note 25, at
342; Roach, supra note 38, at 388 (simplifying these distinctions by equating “inquisi-
torial” with “continental”).
199. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PE´REZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION 127 (3d ed. 2007).
200. The Constitution Criminalis Carolina (1532) codified both the private and offi-
cial accusatory process. See Kai Ambos Zum heutigen Verstaendnis von Akkusation-
sprinzip und –verfahren aus historischer Sicht, 30 JURA 586, 590 (2008); Mirjan
Damas˘ka, The Quest for Due Process in the Age of Inquisition, 60 AM. J. COMP. L.
919, 926 (2012) (providing a historical analysis).
201. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure], as amended,
§§ 374–394, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/german_
code_of_criminal_procedure.pdf [http://perma.cc/BJZ9-BAY6] (Ger.). The so-called
“private prosecution” is limited to specific crimes, among them trespass, defamation,
bodily injury, or criminal damage to property. Id. § 374(1). Private prosecution does
not play a significant role in the criminal justice system. EVA LU¨TZ-BINDER, RECHT-
SWIRKLICHKEIT DER PRIVATKLAGE UND UMGESTALTUNG ZU EINEM AUSSO¨HNUNG-
SVERFAHREN: UNTERSUCHUNG UNTER AUSWERTUNG DER PRIVATKLAGEVERFAHREN
DER JAHRE 1992–2002 AUS DEN AMTSGERICHTSBEZIRKEN LANDAU/PFALZ, NEU-
STADT/WEINSTRAbE UND LUDWIGSHAFEN/RHEIN 63–64, 126 (Peter Lang 2010)
(Ger.).
2015] REINVENTING THE TRIAL 217
But what makes a system inquisitorial and what are its defining fea-
tures? Findley, for instance, understands an inquisitorial system as one
in which
a neutral magistrate, rather than the parties themselves, undertakes
the task of managing the investigation and developing and present-
ing the evidence, motivated solely by an interest in finding the truth.
The parties play a less direct role in the process, although often the
prosecutor is cast in the role of a neutral inquisitor, whose task is
defined just as much by the duty to acquit the innocent as to convict
the guilty.202
Slobogin notes that “the Continental system relies heavily upon the
skill, motivation, discipline, and integrity of its professional judges. It
depends on a fair and efficient judicial bureaucracy buttressed by high
standards of selection, training, and performance, and protected from
political and public pressures by a form of judicial tenure.”203 But in-
quisitorial attorneys can be and often are likewise active in the later
pre-trial stages and the trial itself. They often take an adversarial
stance (with many variations in different inquisitorial systems) and are
much less passive than believed. Even when the police are still investi-
gating, attorneys are free to look for evidence and often do so. During
a trial, defense attorneys can file motions to have specific evidence
considered. Furthermore, inquisitorial systems have been character-
ized as having much weaker exclusionary rules than those of the
United States,204 such that they are more truth-oriented. What we will
show in this Part is that, in sum, there are various safeguards against
wrongful convictions implemented on all levels of the German proce-
dural system. But at the same time, defendants’ rights are protected
strongly. We acknowledge that the German system is just one of many
inquisitorially structured systems and differs from systems such as in
France, where fewer adversarial elements exist.205 We will concentrate
on and address three critical aspects of the inquisitorial from which to
202. Findley, supra note 1, at 913 n.5 (citing Mirjan Damas˘ka, Presentation of Evi-
dence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1083, 1088–90 (1975)). His refer-
ence to Damas˘ka does not support his definition. In that particular section, Damas˘ka
briefly explains the nonadversary mode of adjudication and notes that after an inter-
rogation from the bench: “the two parties are permitted to address questions to the
witness, in an attempt to bring out omitted aspects favorable to them, or to add em-
phasis to certain points on which testimony has already been obtained.” Damas˘ka,
supra, at 1089. At the same time, German prosecutors have in fact the duty to “ascer-
tain not only incriminating but also exonerating circumstances.” STPO § 160(2).
203. Slobogin, supra note 1, at 791 (quoting Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Ex-
cesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 517–18 (1992)).
204. PIZZI, supra note 11, at 37–42. Pizzi also argues that a criminal justice system
has a “skewed sense of priorities” when it suppresses reliable evidence at the expense
of an accurate determination of guilt. Id. at 45.
205. See Richard Vogler, Criminal Procedure in France, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
IN EUROPE 171, 188 (Richard Vogler & Barbara Huber eds., Duncker & Humblot
2008).
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evaluate the reform proposals: impartial investigation; the exclusion-
ary rule and defendants’ rights; and judicial control of fact-finding.
A. The Impartial Investigation
Findley’s definition aligns with the common understanding of the
inquisitorial system’s basic features.206 Some European systems, like
the French,207 can be described that way, but others, including the
German, differ. More critically, a neutral and transparent investiga-
tion and search for the truth in the pre-trial phase is an integral part of
any inquisitorial system. From a historical and comparative point of
view, though, the image is more complex. Not all continental Euro-
pean systems are the same; they all have different inquisitorial
frameworks. Some, like France, rely on an examining magistrate who,
after a decision from the prosecutor,208 carries out the instruction to
establish the truth (manifestation de la ve´rite´).209 That examining mag-
istrate has broad discretion in how to conduct the investigation. Other
European countries like Spain, the Netherlands, and Belgium have
retained the feature of an examining magistrate, but Germany abol-
ished it in 1974 and Italy followed suit in 1988.210 In Germany, the
prosecutor and the police—acting as the investigative arm of the pros-
ecutor—dominate the investigative stage.211 The prosecutor and po-
lice have less discretion and might be less driven by “winning.”212 The
only time a judge gets involved is when a search or an arrest is neces-
sary. In this case, an impartial judge (Ermittlungsrichter, “investigative
judge”) has to issue the warrant. The Netherlands also employs a
prosecutor who leads the investigation. Should that lead to sufficient
evidence, an examining judge can be asked to initiate a preliminary
judicial inquiry.213 Whereas in the past only the examining judge could
apply “means of coercion” (search and seizure, wiretapping, etc.), now
these measures are “autonomous,” and the examining judge mainly
examines witnesses.214
Another aspect characteristic of the German prosecutor is his or
her comparably small amount of discretion. The German prosecutor is
largely bound by the principle of legality—the idea that a prosecutor
206. See also Roach, supra note 38, at 413.
207. Vogler, supra note 205, at 179 (explaining that the French system is a mixed
system and lacks crucial procedural safeguards (like the exclusionary rule) that the
German system offers).
208. Id. at 202.
209. Id. at 205.
210. Id.
211. Frase & Weigend, supra note 25, at 322–23.
212. See Findley, supra note 1, at 931.
213. Marc Groenhuijsen & Joep Simmelink, Criminal Procedure in the Netherlands,
in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN EUROPE 385 (Richard Vogler & Barbara Huber eds.,
Duncker & Humblot 2008).
214. Id. at 386.
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must commence investigations if there is evidence that an offence has
been committed.215 Cases are supposed to be disposed of (in whatever
way) by a judge. Dutch investigation and prosecution, however, are
“not matters of duty but of authority,” meaning that, for instance,
“prosecution may be abandoned ‘for reasons of public interest’”216—
i.e., the principle of opportunity. That shows that European systems
are diverse in this regard, and there is no noticeable trend to
strengthen either the principle of legality or the principle of opportu-
nity.217 What European systems do have in common is that prosecu-
tors are not elected officials and therefore do not have to view public
accountability as interfering with the way they pursue cases; that is
different from their American counterparts.218 In France, for example,
candidates for both positions in the judiciary or the prosecutorial ser-
vice are recruited in the same way, have to take similar exams, and are
not elected.219 They do not have to answer to constituents, and they
see that as important for an independent judiciary.220
For the purpose of investigating and prosecuting criminal offenses,
German prosecutors have fairly broad investigatory authority: they
can summon witnesses and suspects, they can guide the police in their
investigation, and under exigent circumstances they can order
searches and seizures.221 In most criminal matters (except homicides
and economic or white-collar crimes) the police conduct their investi-
gation without much oversight from the prosecutor.222 And even in
more serious cases, prosecutors often trust the expertise and experi-
ence of law enforcement. In general, the German system is seen as
“marked by a high degree of cooperation and of mutual trust and con-
fidence between police and prosecutors.”223 Observers described the
215. Vogler, supra note 205, at 24–25.
216. Groenhuijsen & Simmelink, supra note 213, at 392 (quoting statutory
language).
217. Germany, Spain, and Italy trust the principle of legality, whereas England,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and France operate systems of prosecutorial discretion. See
Vogler supra note 205, at 24–25.
218. See Slobogin, supra note 1, at 719 (noting that, because American judges are
mostly elected, their neutrality may be harder to maintain).
219. See Vogler, supra note 205, at 229.
220. Whitman describes a strong state as one that is “relatively powerful” in its
ability “to intervene in civil society without losing political legitimacy” and “autono-
mous,” in that its bureaucracies “are relatively immune to the vagaries of public opin-
ion.” JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 13–14 (Oxford Univ. Press
2003). In this respect, France and Germany are strong states while, in contrast, gov-
ernments in the United States are weak states.
221. Frase & Weigend, supra note 25, at 323 & n.33.
222. Id. at 323. “The great majority of police officers are [called] ‘auxiliary officers’
of the prosecutor and can be dispatched to conduct further investigations” without
direct oversight from the prosecutor. Id.
223. LEONARD H. LEIGH & LUCIA ZEDNER, THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE: A REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE
PRE-TRIAL PHASE IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 26 (1992).
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relationship between both agencies as strikingly harmonious.224 The
prosecutor is expected to investigate in an impartial manner, looking
into both elements of innocence and guilt. This is why the prosecutor
is sometimes described as the most objective officer or department in
the world (“objektivste Beho¨rde der Welt”).225 But, without having
exact data, we can assume that not all prosecutors in Germany are
equally successful in acting entirely neutrally.226 However, the low ac-
quittal rates in Germany and France and the apparent absence of un-
just convictions, according to Leigh and Zedner, are seen as products
of the care taken in the initial stages in the criminal process.227
Only when police consider their investigation complete does the file
reach the desk of the prosecutor who then decides about further steps.
If the prosecutor considers preferment of public charges, he or she
will make a note of the conclusion of the investigation in the files.228
From that point on, the defense has a right to review the dossier.229
Use of a dossier varies across Europe.230 During the investigative
stage, defense attorneys can be involved but are not usually as active
(and do not need to be as active) as the prosecutor. Although disclo-
sure of evidence is different in the United States, it has been argued
that “in practice . . . German pre-trial procedure closely resembles the
224. Id. at 71.
225. It makes sense to view this statement in light of tunnel-vision, on the one
hand, and prosecutorial culture on the other. The Authors assume, arguendo, that all
honest prosecutors operate (as do all human actors) with cognitive biases that tend to
shape their decisions toward guilt. The quoted slogan appears to express pride in a
culture of objectivity, though the search for the truth is a different matter. This is a
genuine cultural marker for German prosecutors even assuming, again arguendo, that
human ideals are never fully realized. To test these assumptions, prosecutorial cul-
tures should be the subject of comparative social science research. Cf. FLOYD FEENEY
& JOACHIM HERRMANN, ONE CASE—TWO SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF
AMERICAN AND GERMAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2005) (comparing prosecutorial cul-
tures in Germany and the United States); Chrisje Brants, Tunnel Vision, Belief Perse-
verance and Bias Confirmation: Only Human?, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS &
MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE: CAUSES AND REMEDIES IN NORTH AMERICAN AND EU-
ROPEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 161 (C. Ronald Huff & Martin Killias eds.,
Routledge 2013).
226. Leigh & Zedner note that it is more likely for prosecutors to look into excul-
patory facts when the suspect is unrepresented or a juvenile. LEIGH & ZEDNER, supra
note 223, at 36. As soon as a suspect has counsel, the prosecutor relies on the defense
to establish indicia of innocence. Id.
227. Id. at 71–72. That statement needs further scrutiny because acquittal rates are
affected by many factors and not only the quality of the investigation.
228. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure], as amended,
§ 169a, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/german_code_
of_criminal_procedure.pdf [http://perma.cc/BJZ9-BAY6] (Ger.).
229. Id. § 147(1). In general, most documents included in the dossier are sent to the
attorney’s place of practice where he or she is free to make copies, scans, etc. Section
147(2) of the STPO gives the prosecutor the discretion to let the defense review the
files even earlier if such a review does not interfere with the investigation. Id.
§ 147(2).
230. Amboss, supra note 200, at 593, mentions Germany, France, Netherlands, Por-
tugal, and Austria as countries that use dossiers.
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American model . . . .”231 German prosecutors are charged with find-
ing the truth just like the American prosecutor, whose aim is twofold:
“that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.”232 In that regard, and
on a purely structural level, “the German system . . . has more in com-
mon with American criminal justice than does the French system.”233
More significant differences emerge in the following stages of a case.
In historical perspective, the idea of the inquisitorial transcends the
pre-trial and trial stages and includes more than an unbiased, neutral
investigation. Kai Ambos in his analysis of the current understanding
of what he calls the German “accusatory” system summarizes three
aspects as the core of the inquisitorial process: First, the official and ex
officio pursuit of an investigation (Offizialmaxime, indagatio criminis);
second, the (secret) investigation (Inquisitionsmaxime, inquisitio); and
third, the principle of substantive truth (veritas delicti).234 The princi-
ple of substantive truth binds the prosecutor, who is charged with the
investigation of the facts. But it also binds the judge and the court.235
According to Eberhard Schmidt, the nature of the inquisitorial pro-
cess is “that the investigation is based on an official initiative, that
official acts keep the process from the first suspicion . . . to the verdict
going and that . . . proof is based on rational methods.”236 The second
element Schmidt mentions as being crucial is the principle of instruc-
tion—“the duty of the official institutions to put themselves into the
picture of the material facts and the objective truth.”237 Where the
principle of an official investigation and the principle of instruction
meet, “the inquisitorial process stands before us.”238 This principle of
instruction requires the (trial) judge to clear up, reconstruct, and in-
vestigate the facts of a case239 in the most comprehensive way. The
231. Frase & Weigend, supra note 25, at 352.
232. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
233. Frase & Weigend, supra note 25, at 353 (footnote omitted). This needs a little
more context, but it shows that procedure in itself might be less important than “soft”
features when it comes to accurate fact finding.
234. Ambos supra note 200, at 593. In continental trial systems “personal belief [is]
the controlling criterion” for the decision of a trial judge or lay assessor; in contrast,
the American jury verdict is a group—not an individual—decision and is the product
of democratic deliberation in which a juror’s inner voice may legitimately “be
trumped by [the] intersubjectively valid decisional criteria” of the majority. MIRJAN
R. DAMAS˘KA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 38, 39 (Yale Univ. Press 1997).
235. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure], as amended,
§ 244(2), translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/german_code_
of_criminal_procedure.pdf [http://perma.cc/BJZ9-BAY6] (Ger.) (“In order to estab-
lish the truth, the court shall [ex officio] extend the taking of evidence to all facts and
means of proof relevant to the decision.”).
236. EBERHARD SCHMIDT, EINFU¨HRUNG IN DIE GESCHICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN
STRAFRECHTSPFLEGE 86 (3d ed. 1965) (translations are Grunewald’s).
237. Id. at 86–87.
238. Id. at 87.
239. See STPO § 155(2) (mandating that “the courts shall be authorized and obliged
to act independently” and/or autonomously in their pursuit of the truth); Id. § 244(2);
see also supra note 202.
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principle of instruction stands in contrast to the principle of negotia-
tion (Verhandlungsmaxime or Dispositionsmaxime),240 a concept
more prevalent in European civil trials.241
We next review a central feature of the impartial investigation—the
role of the judge.
B. Judicial Dominance of the Trial
The presiding judge conducts German criminal trials.242 The whole
criminal justice system in Germany is judge-centered. Lay-elements in
decision-making exist but are not as dominant as in the United States.
The German system trusts in an independent and professionally
trained decision-maker.243 The judge then uses the dossier as a basis
for his or her own reconstruction of the case. The principle of instruc-
tion allows the court to expand its view beyond the facts that are in-
cluded in the dossier or the story presented by the prosecutor or the
defense.244 The attorneys in a German trial have a right to question
witnesses (after the judge finished his or her questioning), and they
can make specific requests of further proof (Beweisantrag). Courts
usually comply with these requests245 and can refuse a request of
proof only for fairly limited reasons.246 But since it is the court’s ob-
jective to determine the truth,247 the role of the attorneys is not fully
comparable to attorneys in the United States, where their action and
involvement is essential. With regard to evidence law, a comparison
240. GWLADYS GILLIE´RON, PUBLIC PROSECUTORS IN THE UNITED STATES AND
EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH SPECIAL FOCUS ON SWITZERLAND,
FRANCE, AND GERMANY 26 (Springer 2014).
241. In civil trials the court bases its decision on the evidence supported by the
parties and has only little investigative authority. Although there are differences in
the function of judges in civil proceedings in the United States and Germany, “law-
yers for the parties play major and broadly comparable roles in both the German and
American systems. Both are adversary systems of civil procedure.” John H. Langbein,
The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 824 (1985).
242. STPO § 238(1) (“The presiding judge presides over the trial, interrogates the
defendant and takes the evidence.”).
243. Curiously, as the Authors will address later, within legal scholarship in the
United States, there is only a little criticism of the jury as a fact finder and contributor
to wrongful convictions. Kent Roach, for instance, acknowledges that bench trials in
the United States reflect values of reasoned decision making that are found in judge-
dominated inquisitorial systems: “Decreased use of juries might increase the ability of
the justice system to reach accurate results, especially in cases involving complex sci-
entific evidence.” Roach, supra note 38, at 418.
244. This is accomplished by requesting the police or prosecutor to collect more
evidence. See Barbara Huber, Criminal Procedure in Germany, in CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE IN EUROPE 269, 332 (Richard Vogler & Barbara Huber eds., Duncker & Hum-
blot 2008).
245. Frase & Weigend, supra note 25, at 342. As is the case in many areas of crimi-
nal procedure, the circumstances under which such a request for further proof can be
denied is the subject of a heated debate.
246. Id.
247. STPO § 244(2) (“In order to establish the truth, the court shall [ex officio],
extend the taking of evidence to all facts and means relevant to the decision.”).
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would need more space than we have here. In some respect, and be-
cause of the judge-driven proceedings, rules of (trial) evidence are less
strict than in the United States.248 Hearsay evidence, for example, is
not excluded per se in Germany because it is subject to the court’s
duty to hear all evidence that pertains to finding the truth.249 But
there are limitations on the use of hearsay evidence, and judges have
to carefully justify its use in their decisions. In other regards, German
criminal procedure recognizes many testimonial privileges.
The involvement and dominance of judges is still seen as one of the
major truth-promoting elements in the German system. Judges are
charged with establishing the truth, and truth itself is of constitutional
significance.250 In 2013, the German Federal Constitutional Court
mandated that this charge also should permeate the plea bargaining
process.251 The judicial decision-making process has a high degree of
transparency and allows for review of fact and law. Judges have to
write out their verdicts and have to explain which fact they used for
which element of the crime. They have to answer why they saw a spe-
cific witness as credible and why they trusted an expert. For most
cases, an appeal regarding fact and law is possible. Whether or not the
judge followed the truth-finding objective can be reviewed on appeal
as a question of law. Cases can be reopened if new evidence is found,
regardless of the time that has passed after the verdict. German trial
records, however, only show formally relevant aspects of the proceed-
ings (motions, summoning witnesses, putting witnesses under oath,
etc.) but do not include verbatim statements from witnesses and
defendants.
248. See Frase & Weigend, supra note 25, at 342.
249. “Continental fact-finders are continuously awash in hearsay.” DAMAS˘KA,
supra note 234, at 49. Damas˘ka explains that the American exclusion of hearsay at
trial has more to do with the bifurcated nature of American trial courts than the usual
story that hearsay will be given undue credence by amateur jurors. Id. at 48–52.
250. According to the German Federal Constitutional Court, finding the truth is
mandated by the German Constitution through the Schuldprinzip (“guilt principle”),
the standard that individual guilt/blameworthiness is the basis for and limit of any
sentence or intervention. See Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfG] [Federal Constitu-
tional Court], Mar. 19, 2013, 2 BVR 2628/10, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/
SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2013/03/rs20130319_2bvr262810en.html [http://
perma.cc/UZ8K-JL2Y].
251. Id. Plea bargaining is still not the default way to dispose of cases, and if a plea
bargain (the German variation of it) happens, it is regulated and conducted with judi-
cial oversight. See STPO § 257b; see also Christopher Slobogin, Plea Bargaining and
the Substantive and Procedural Goals of Criminal Justice: From Retribution and Ad-
versarialism to Preventive Justice and Hybrid-Inquisitorialism, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 20–21), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2583898 [http://perma.cc/TWC2-E267]. Slobogin argues that an in-
quisitorial-style type of plea bargaining is “more likely than American practice to
produce well-honed punishments, and to expose whether improper agendas—for in-
stance, excessively harsh bargains based on misinformation from the prosecution or
inappropriate leniency based on substantial assistance from serious offenders—are
driving any bargains that are reached.” Id. at 21 (footnote omitted).
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As we stressed earlier, even inquisitorial systems implement adver-
sarial elements (to a smaller or greater extent); what sets them apart
from the American system is not so much the truth-bound prosecutor,
but that the judge is the head of trial proceedings. In Germany, judges
have a duty to investigate and establish the material truth.252 They are
not influenced by the activity or inactivity of the parties, nor are they
bound by the narrative or the evidence contained in the dossier. Dur-
ing trial, they can investigate independently by, for example, calling
and questioning witnesses and experts, examining the evidence with
their own eyes, and reading all of the documents. Judges establish a
defendant’s guilt solely on the evidence introduced in trial and de-
velop the forensic truth.253 By law, the judiciary is impartial and
objective.
Apart from the rules that establish and protect the standards of the
judiciary, there is also a culture that trusts in career judges to be im-
partial. In contrast to the United States, German judges are not for-
mer litigators and German legal education pivots around the judge as
the ideal type lawyer. Especially during their first years at the univer-
sity, law students are trained to see both or many sides of a legal ques-
tion. Until the first state examination (usually after four years), law
students only write “expert opinions” (Gutachten) on legal questions
that address all potential aspects of a case—facts are usually undis-
puted. Afterwards, in the second part of their education, students
learn to argue within an adversarial setting, taking the side of a plain-
tiff, defendant, or the state, but the default angle is still from the
judge’s perspective. As difficult as it might be to connect wrongful
convictions (or the lack thereof) to a legal culture, the background of
the main decision-makers is important. It has been argued that tunnel
vision can be a particularly negative side effect of concentrating the
decision-making power in judges254 and that it might be a cause for
specific types of wrongful convictions in Germany. At the same time,
however, there are very few German cases in which a mistaken identi-
fication has led to a wrongful conviction.255
The judge in Gross’s model resembles American judges in civil
bench trials who do not need to adhere to the tight timeframes of
criminal jury trials where the witnesses assemble to testify.256 Euro-
252. See STPO § 244(2).
253. Section 261 of STPO requires that “[t]he court shall decide on the result of the
evidence taken according to its free conviction gained from the hearing as a whole.”
STPO § 261; see also Thomas Weigend & Jenia Iontcheva Turner, The Constitutional-
ity of Negotiated Criminal Judgments in Germany, 15 GERMAN L.J. 81, 85 (2014).
254. Findley, supra note 1, at 928; see also Findley & Scott, supra note 4, at 307–31;
supra note 225 (regarding prosecutorial tunnel vision).
255. And then again, it is hard to say if that is an effect of a balanced pre-trial
investigation or the judiciary.
256. Although German law requires that trial be continuous, delays up to a month
occur so that witnesses can be secured. See FEENEY & HERRMANN, supra note 225, at
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pean judges rely heavily on case dossiers that result from the impartial
investigations made by civil service professionals whose agencies do
not have the political baggage of most American prosecutor’s offices.
And while the harmonious police-prosecution relationship—a hall-
mark of German criminal justice—may occur in America, it is not al-
ways the case.257
On further reflection, Gross’s proposal about the actual role of the
judge vis-a`-vis the trial attorneys is elusive, although he places the
judge at the center of the investigative trial:
Judges would have to take on an entirely new task—leading judicial
investigations—and do it well. Unless the judges who conduct inves-
tigative trials are seen as effective and open-minded, defendants
won’t choose this option and prosecutors won’t cooperate. It will
wither on the vine. On the other hand, if both sides learn to trust
the judges, this procedure could take root. But that’s a big If.258
Does this imply that, as in continental trials, the judge takes the lead
in questioning witnesses and only allows the prosecution and defense
attorney to ask follow-up questions when the judge is finished? If so,
the process might fail, not because of any personal attributes of the
judge but because the adversary system does not produce a dossier on
which the judge bases truth-probing questions. The parties control the
adversary process, in which “each side . . . present[s] evidence that has
already been assembled, in an attempt to persuade a passive tribu-
nal.”259 Slobogin’s assertion that “[m]oving in an inquisitional direc-
tion would not require drastic changes to the current American
system . . . . [because] [f]iles resembling European dossiers are already
prepared in many United States jurisdictions”260 seems far too opti-
mistic. It ignores the powerful argument made by Damas˘ka that conti-
nental and American justice systems are deeply embedded in
governmental systems rooted in centuries of development that reflect
profoundly different approaches to democratic and constitutional
polities. Under this view, the (American) reactive state reflects the
coordinate ideal, and the (European) active state reflects the hierar-
chical ideal.261 To become active, the judge would not only require the
instincts of a continental judge but would need to be supported by a
system that supplies the right kind of evidence on which intelligent
and probing inquiries can proceed.262
394. “In German procedure truth-finding obviously takes precedent over the idea that
the trial should be a short, continuous process.” Id.
257. George F. Cole, The Decision to Prosecute, 4 L. & SOC’Y REV. 331 (1970).
258. Gross, supra note 1, at 1028.
259. Id. at 1027.
260. Slobogin, supra note 1, at 719.
261. MIRJAN R. DAMAS˘KA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (Yale Univ. Press 1986).
262. If anything, the trend in adversarial systems is to push the judge more toward
the role of the referee and less an active prober or even commenter on evidence. See
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C. Defendants’ Rights within Inquisitorial Systems
So far, we have stressed Germany’s focus on factual truth and ar-
gued that comparative scholarship must look at the idea of the inquisi-
torial in a way that encompasses the whole system and not just the
pre-trial or trial phase. But in addition to its emphasis on elements
that advance truth-finding, German criminal procedure also protects
defendants’ rights—often much more broadly than in the United
States. That stands in contrast to Roach’s assumption that continental
systems are willing to sacrifice defendants’ rights in favor of pursuing
the truth,263 a view that might have also influenced Bakken’s, Gross’s,
and Slobogin’s models.
American lawyers and scholars may think that inquisitorial systems,
with their focus on truth and bias toward the admissibility of evidence,
reduce “truth obstructing” rights (Findley’s term)264 like the privilege
against self-incrimination as well as evidentiary barriers like the hear-
say rule. These views are problematic because European legal culture
provides many protections for the defendant that are comparable to
those practiced in the United States, and the dominant role of profes-
sional judges discounts the biasing effects of evidence that would be
thought to render American jury verdicts unfair and inaccurate. Nev-
ertheless, Bakken, Gross, and Slobogin would limit defendants’ rights
to comport with their understanding of the inquisitorial system and
broad allowance of evidence.
At both the pre-trial and trial stage, suspects and defendants enjoy
considerable rights regarding their degree of participation and what
kind of evidence can be used against them. In the pre-trial phase, the
prosecutor is the “primary guarantor of the integrity of the investiga-
tive” stage and, as Leigh and Zedner observe, “he has distinct respon-
sibilities for safeguarding the rights of the suspect.”265 Defendants,
their doctors, and even their family members enjoy substantial privi-
leges under German criminal law. For example, every suspect has the
right against self-incrimination, including the right to remain silent.
Suspects also receive “Miranda warnings” (which are worded very
similarly to the American warnings). In contrast to the United States,
these warnings are triggered as soon as a person becomes a crime sus-
pect, regardless of whether this person is in custody or formally inter-
rogated. That means that if police have or, during a conversation with
a person, develop the suspicion that he might be involved in a crime,
Paul Marcus, Judges Talking to Jurors in Criminal Cases: Why U.S. Judges Do It So
Differently from Just About Everyone Else, 30 ARIZ. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 1, 5, 38–39
(2013).
263. Roach, supra note 38, at 435.
264. See Findley, supra note 1, at 917.
265. LEIGH & ZEDNER, supra note 223, at 35.
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police must inform that person about his privileges.266 Any police or
prosecutorial interrogation must be free of actions that influence deci-
sion-making or the memory of the suspect.267 This includes induced
fatigue, any kind of physical interference, coercion, or deception.268
Any suspected ill-treatment of a suspect who is in (preliminary) de-
tention will lead to an immediate investigation.269 Defendants are not
considered witnesses and cannot perjure themselves, meaning that
they can lie without penalty or consequences at any stage of the pro-
ceedings, even when on the stand.270 Further, spouses, fiance´s, or civil
partners can refuse to testify even if their relationship with the defen-
dant no longer exists. Relatives can also refuse to testify against the
defendant and so can specific groups of professionals like doctors, at-
torneys, and members of the clergy.271 Public officials (like civil ser-
vants) might need permission to testify in court if testimony
potentially endangers the proper fulfilling of an official task.272 As this
shows, Germany broadly protects a suspect’s right against self-incrimi-
nation. And it probably would not be far-fetched to assume that many
of the interrogation techniques used in the United States would be
problematic under German law.273
When it comes to the question of excluding relevant evidence from
the trial, the German system shows similarities to the United States,
but because of its structure it has to implement the exclusionary rule
differently. The deterrence rationale, which is so strong in the United
States, does not play much of a role in German legal thinking.274 Be-
cause the dossier includes both inadmissible and admissible evidence,
German judges are usually aware of all of the evidence on which they
can base their decisions. In general, evidence is excluded for two rea-
sons: (1) It was obtained in an unlawful manner, or (2) obtaining or
266. Huber, supra note 244, at 301–02. United States constitutional law is to the
contrary. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 319 (1994) (per curiam) (holding that
an officer’s subjective and undisclosed view concerning whether interrogee is a sus-
pect is irrelevant to an assessment of whether that person is in custody).
267. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure], as amended,
§ 136a(2), translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/german_code
_of_criminal_procedure.pdf [http://perma.cc/BJZ9-BAY6] (Ger.).
268. It would be prohibited, for example, to tell a suspect he or she was incrimi-
nated by another suspect/person if that is not the case. United States constitutional
law is to the contrary. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969) (allowing police
deception).
269. LEIGH & ZEDNER, supra note 223, at 37.
270. Frase & Weigend, supra note 25, at 343.
271. STPO § 52–53.
272. Frase & Weigend, supra note 25, at 342.
273. See Dorothy Heyl, The Limits of Deception: An End to the Use of Lies and
Trickery in Custodial Interrogations to Elicit the “Truth”?, 77 ALB. L. REV. 931 (2013/
2014) (describing how the New York Court of Appeals has placed some limits on
police deception).
274. Craig M. Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1032,
1035 (1983).
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using a specific kind of evidence violates the constitution, particularly
the defendant’s privacy rights.
German law excludes evidence obtained in violation of section 136a
of the German Code of Criminal Procedure (prohibiting acts like
threats and deception during the suspect’s examination). This is the
only provision in the procedural code that explicitly regulates the ex-
clusion of evidence. But it serves as an expression of the idea that
there “does not exist a principle in criminal procedure which requires
that the truth be won at any price.”275 That means that in other cases,
a violation of a procedural rule or other law can lead to the exclusion
of evidence. But German courts usually balance the seriousness of the
offence and the seriousness of the violation in order to decide whether
they must throw evidence out.276
Unique to German criminal procedure is the general protection of a
person’s privacy. That privacy, as interpreted by courts, includes a per-
son’s dignity, his or her sexual orientation, and privately spoken and
written words in an intimate diary.277 German courts distinguish be-
tween spheres of privacy.278 Evidence deriving from an expression of
the innermost intimate sphere is considered untouchable and can
never be used (for instance, entries in a diary do not touch “the sphere
of others”).279 By contrast, evidence that stems from the merely pri-
vate but not-yet-intimate (core) sphere can be used, but only if com-
munity interests in crime control or prevention prevail over its
exclusion. Courts have to balance the kind and type of crime (felony
or misdemeanor) in question and can consider how probative the in-
formation is. For example, the more a diary entry elaborates on
planned or completed crimes the less likely it is that it will be ex-
cluded.280 This mechanism looks at evidence on an individual case
level. The German exclusionary law appears to be tighter in some in-
stances, such as intimate content and police deception, but allows for
broader inclusion of evidence in others.
As argued earlier, the German system does not see procedural
rights as either inhibiting or supporting factual truth—they are a dif-
ferent category and follow a different purpose. Any suspect, factually
275. Kuk Cho,“Procedural Weakness” of German Criminal Justice and Its Unique
Exclusionary Rules Based on the Right of Personality, 15 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1,
18 (2001) (quoting the German Federal Court of Justice for criminal matters).
276. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143 (2009), in effect makes the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule discretionary and dependent on the judge’s perception
of the egregiousness of the police action. Textualists accept this shaky foundation for
a constitutional right because they do not view the exclusionary rule as a core compo-
nent of Fourth Amendment rights.
277. See Frase & Weigend, supra note 25, at 334–35.
278. See Cho, supra note 275, at 26–27.
279. See Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court],
BVerfGE 80, 367, 373–74, http://sorminiserv.unibe.ch:8080/tools/ainfo.exe?Command
=ShowPrintVersion&Name=BV080367 [http://perma.cc/SEA9-R42E] (Ger.).
280. Id. at 374–76.
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guilty or innocent, has a lot to lose by waiving constitutional rights.
An innocent remark may lead to further investigation and incrimina-
tion, as attested by false confessions. It is problematic to assume that
inquisitorial systems per se (or “inquisitorialness”) come with limited
procedural rights, as most have protections for suspects and defend-
ants.281 German criminal procedure curbs the search for truth quite
extensively, as does the American.282 The German process, however,
accepts these limitations and reduces its search for truth to evidence
that is constitutionally acceptable.
In view of German law’s strong rights-protection, the apparent logic
that motivated Bakken, Gross, and Slobogin to weaken American
trial rights can be seen as embedded in adversary structure. As they
tinker with the machinery of justice to get to the truth, they are con-
cerned that a guilty party may hide behind innocence procedures and
therefore propose that defendants lower—if not drop—their shields.
However, that would lead to all defendants losing their rights and pro-
tections. When European defendants offer information, they do so for
different purposes283 and in systems with their own safeguards,284 in-
cluding the extra-procedural but overwhelmingly important factor of
281. Bakken, for example, describes the inquisitorial process as being less protec-
tive than criminal procedures. Bakken, supra note 1, at 567–68 (“[T]o invoke inno-
cence procedures, defendants would have to relinquish the more protective
procedures . . . in favor of procedures more common in . . . inquisitorial processes.”
(footnote omitted)). See Mirjan Damas˘ka, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and
Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506,
507, 507–08 n.1 (1973) (questioning the claim from Justice Douglas’s dissent in John-
son v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 391–94 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting), “that the
‘higher evidentiary barricades’ to conviction somehow emanate from the very nature
of adversary proceedings and that their lowering smacks of the ‘inquisitorial’ conti-
nental procedure”).
282. “Privacy rights protected by the Fourth Amendment, for example, can lead to
the exclusion of undeniably relevant and reliable evidence.” Findley, supra note 1, at
917.
283. German criminal procedure is not bifurcated into a distinct guilt and sentenc-
ing stage. That means, for example, that if in the light of incriminating evidence the
defense wants to introduce mitigating aspects relevant for the sentence, this has to
happen during the trial. See Detleff Burhoff, Einlassungsverhalten des Beschuldigten
[Concession Behavior of the Defendant], 2002 PRAXIS STEUERSTRAFRECHT 176,
https://www.burhoff.de/insert/?/veroeff/aufsatz/pstr_2002_176.htm [http://perma.cc/
6VWK-HJ6R].
284. European systems vary in how much they expect the defendant to offer infor-
mation. The French system has long been seen as more inquisitorial than, for instance,
the German. But today, defendants are provided with the means to intervene actively
in their own defense. That includes the right to know the details of the accusation,
right to silence, and right to counsel. In France, these rights are strongest in the in-
struction period, but are not that well protected in the earlier stages in the proceed-
ings. Vogler, supra note 205, at 192. A detailed description of a French murder trial
portrays the defendant participating in an extensive forensic reexamination being
conducted by the prosecution, thus providing a sound basis for the verdict. Bron
McKillop, Anatomy of a French Murder Case, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 527, 537–41 (1997).
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lower maximum and actual sentences.285 A defendant, who presuma-
bly knows where he or she was at the time of an alleged crime, could
add much light about relevant circumstances by providing informa-
tion. Yet, an innocent defendant will likely have a vague recollection
of the date and time of the crime if nothing memorable occurred, re-
sulting in weak or initially erroneous alibis that become incriminating
evidence.286 There is, nevertheless, the temptation to interpret silence
as masking guilt, and distrust of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion has a long legal heritage.287 Seasoned scholars may agree with
Daniel Givelber’s observation, borrowed from comparative scholar
John Merryman, that an innocent defendant would prefer to be tried
in an inquisitorial court, but a guilty one would take his chances in a
common law trial.288 This experience-based assertion speaks to the
sense that adversary gamesmanship, along with trial-based exclusion-
ary rules like hearsay, may generate wrongful acquittals.289 But with-
out careful analysis of the systems today, given the continental
commitment to rights, this view could be mistaken. A broader view of
continental justice may see greater justice not only in trial procedures
like a defendant’s ability to successfully obtain specific and repeated
forensic tests290 but also in the truth-irrelevant but profoundly impor-
tant context of civilized and less-degrading penal systems.291
D. Evaluating the Reform Models in Light
of Continental Procedure
Having sketched three inquisitorial themes and commented on how
the five proposals fit those themes, we now review each proposal for
more nuanced analysis. If pre-trial stage police errors generate most
285. McKillop, supra note 284, at 560; Frase & Weigend, supra note 25, at 346; see
also Dana Goldstein, Too Old to Commit a Crime?, N.Y. TIMES: SUNDAY REVIEW
(Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/22/sunday-review/too-old-to-commit
-crime.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/D3E5-8DRS] (advocating “a 20-year cap on federal
prison terms with an option for parole boards or judges to add more time if necessary
to protect the public”).
286. JENNIFER THOMPSON-CANNINO ET AL., PICKING COTTON: OUR MEMOIR OF
INJUSTICE AND REDEMPTION 86 (St. Martin’s Press 2009); Serial: The Alibi, IRA
GLASS (Oct. 2014), http://serialpodcast.org/ [http://perma.cc/BDX3-VLDP].
287. Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitu-
tional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 672–74 (1968); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609, 622 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“The California rule allowing comment by
counsel and instruction by the judge on the defendant’s failure to take the stand is
hardly an idiosyncratic aberration.”) (reflecting a widespread view). Under German
law, however, no negative inferences must be drawn from a defendant who makes full
use of his right not to testify. See Burhoff, supra note 283.
288. Givelber, supra note 8, at 1317.
289. But see DANIEL GIVELBER & AMY FARRELL, NOT GUILTY: ARE THE ACQUIT-
TED INNOCENT? (N.Y. Univ. Press 2012).
290. See McKillop, supra note 284.
291. WHITMAN, supra note 220; CRAIG HANEY, REFORMING PUNISHMENT: PSY-
CHOLOGICAL LIMITS TO THE PAINS OF IMPRISONMENT (Am. Psychological Ass’n
2006).
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wrongful convictions, excessive adversarialness and tunnel vision lim-
its the ability of courts to sort out erroneous prosecutions. Integrating
inquisitorial elements into the adversary system is an obvious move to
improve trial accuracy. To that end, Gross and Slobogin contemplate
continental-style judge control of the trial, with Gross going beyond
the adversarial setup of the American trial system to construct a
model resembling the German system.292
Risinger’s “factual innocence trial” rules expand the judge’s role to
a more inquisitorial one but do so by shaping the scope of evidence
presented to the cross-sectional jury, as the trier of fact in innocence
proceedings. From a comparative perspective, the evidence presented
to the jury is somehow regimented and tightly controlled—“manu-
aled,” so to speak. Given that the jury is instructed in a very compre-
hensive way, the question remains: Why not then have a judge decide
“binary fact” cases?293 From a comparative perspective, the bifurca-
tion of two kinds of prosecution (polyvalent or binary) appears con-
ceptually plausible but slightly artificial. While “establishing” a
defendant’s state of mind is a subjective decision that a jury may be
able to make as well as, if not better than a judge, there is no guaran-
tee that Risinger’s factual innocence trial rules will in fact produce
verdicts that are more accurate than current-day trials. From the
American perspective, however, the elected judge in a bench trial
does not have the same level of training, control, or reliance on as
carefully constructed a dossier as the continental judge.294 In that
light, a state-of-mind issue might indeed be better decided by a jury,
especially if the defendant can decide whether to opt for a bench or
jury trial. The unsafe verdict review also allows for a more effective
case review because, like appeals in Germany, it incorporates ques-
tions of how the factual basis of a case was established. Again from a
comparative perspective, it is not clear how to maintain the integrity
of the jury and trust in its ability to decide questions of fact accurately,
especially given that it remains a “black box” whereas a continental
judge must explain a verdict’s factual basis.
Bakken also focuses mostly on the pre-trial and trial stages. The
main purpose of his “innocence procedure” is to ensure that prosecu-
tors search for the truth by inducing enhanced pre-trial police investi-
gations.295 If the prosecutor does not comply and, for example, fails to
assist in investigating innocence, jurors could acquit the defendant. By
forcing the government to look at all sides of a case and conduct a
292. See Strafprozessordnung [STPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure], as amended,
§ 359, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/german_code_of
_criminal_procedure.pdf [http://perma.cc/BJZ9-BAY6] (Ger.).
293. This raises the possibility that Risinger’s approach could stimulate judges to
become more active in motions to dismiss after the prosecution’s case or in post-trial
motions in arrest of judgment.
294. See supra Part III, Section B.
295. Bakken, supra note 1, at 572.
232 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3
thorough investigation, Bakken tries to foster an “inquisitorial in-
quiry.”296 Government investigators would “look at evidence differ-
ently, trying to determine whether it pointed toward innocence
instead of evaluating whether it would be sufficient to convince a jury
of the defendant’s guilt.”297 That is fairly comparable to the job
description of a German (but also American) prosecutor. What dif-
fers, however, are the consequences when an investigator does not
look at a case comprehensively. In Germany, almost no direct conse-
quences exist if the police or prosecutors do not search for evidence
that supports a notion of innocence.298 One reason might simply be
the culture that exists within the German police and prosecutorial of-
fices. Although tunnel vision can affect German prosecutors and the
police (and, to be very clear, we are aware that even the best educa-
tion and most professional socialization will not be able to prevent
cognitive biases), the prosecutor is still seen as a fundamentally objec-
tive institution.299 Most reform models, including Bakken’s, seem to
substitute procedure for what is lacking in the existing police culture
and the institutional separation of police from prosecutors in Ameri-
can state systems.
A second reason for the lack of direct consequences from a one-
sided investigation can be seen in the dominant role judges play in the
German criminal justice system. A judge, who is charged with finding
the truth, would ideally recognize a one-sided or biased investigation.
That also explains why there are not different standards of proof for
defendants who claim innocence or who confess. Even when a defen-
dant admits to a crime, because there are no “pleas” in the technical
sense in Germany, the confession is just one piece of evidence that
needs to be evaluated based on its probative value. Again ideally,
judges cannot draw any inferences from a defendant’s claim of inno-
cence, nor can they more easily acquit the defendant when they see
that the prosecutor conducted a biased investigation. Like some other
authors, Bakken suggests that defendants who claim innocence give
up essential procedural rights; that again blurs the line between con-
cepts of procedural justice and substantive truth. Although Bakken
points out the limitations and lack of truth-orientation of post-convic-
tion procedures, he does not address how the appellate system can be
changed to make it more truthful. Here he diverts from how truth is
protected in Germany. At the same time, Bakken leaves the jury un-
296. Id. at 561–62.
297. Id. at 562.
298. A prosecutor might face potential disciplinary consequences should he or she
investigate in an unbalanced manner.
299. The German scholar Franz von Liszt did not agree with the notion that the
prosecutor is the “most objective office in the world” because prosecutors are subject
to directives, but he stressed the importance of the truth-finding objective as being a
key characteristic of that office. Franz von Liszt, Vortrag im Berliner Anwaltsverein, in
DEUTSCHE JURISTEN-ZEITUNG [DJZ] 179, 180 (1901) (Ger.).
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touched in the sense that it still is the fact-finder and its verdict on the
factual basis of a case is essentially unreviewable.
Gross includes many features that exist in European systems and
proposes to change the judge’s role by “leading judicial investiga-
tions.” This resembles the function and role of German judges. And
just like in Germany, Gross’s investigative trials are “open-minded,
judge-led inquiries into the facts of contested prosecutions.”300 Juries
are not involved in the fact-finding process, and the trial is seen as a
continuing process that narrows the gap between trial and discov-
ery.301 Finality is also more limited since a defendant who was con-
victed at an investigative trial has the “right to reopen the case if he
presents substantial new evidence of innocence.”302 That resembles
section 359 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure.303
Gross argues that the advantages of the new proceedings should
only be available when a defendant waives “major procedural
rights,”304 assuming that innocent defendants are likely to benefit
from full disclosure and open consideration of evidence. Defendants,
in Gross’s understanding, have comparatively little to lose. To avoid
abusive interrogation tactics, Gross puts an attorney in the interroga-
tion room. This is where the model departs from the German idea of
procedural justice. Gross seems to assume that “many guilty defend-
ants . . . hope that essential evidence against them will be sup-
pressed”305 in court and that innocent defendants have nothing to hide
and can only benefit from any disclosure. Procedural rights, so it
sounds, are for the guilty, not the innocent. At least in Germany, pro-
cedural rights and protection serve different purposes than furthering
or limiting the truth.306 These protections are in place to prevent a
suspect—whether “innocent” or “guilty”—from becoming “the mere
objects of criminal proceedings”307 and to ensure that basic ideas of
300. Gross, supra note 1, at 1029.
301. Id. at 1026.
302. Id. at 1027.
303. Section 359 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure allows for a reopening
of the proceedings concluded by a final judgment for a variety of reasons. Strafprozes-
sordnung [STPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure], as amended § 359, translation at
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/ger-
man_code_of_criminal_procedure.pdf [http://perma.cc/BJZ9-BAY6] (Ger.). The most
important in our context is “new facts or evidence” that tend to support the defen-
dant’s acquittal or, upon application of a less severe penal norm, a lesser sentence. Id.
304. Gross, supra note 1, at 1023.
305. Id. at 1024.
306. Ralph Grunewald, Comparing Injustices: Truth, Justice, and the System, 77
ALB. L. REV. 1139 (2013/2014).
307. The German Federal Constitutional Court has repeatedly stressed what has
become a foundational idea of the German criminal justice system, that the state in its
pursuit of justice and the protection of its citizens must not make the suspect the
object of the criminal process. The suspect must be given the opportunity to influence
the course of the proceedings in order to exercise his rights. While most of these rights
could be listed (and many are comparable to the rights a defendant in the United
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due process and of the constitution are maintained. From a compara-
tive perspective, at least in the scholarly debate in Germany, there is
very little criticism regarding procedural protections that allow too
many guilty defendants to leave the court unpunished.
Findley is skeptical of America’s career judges and prosecutors be-
cause they are drawn from its “sharply adversarial system and cul-
ture.”308 German (and European) prosecutors, according to Findley,
are not comparable to American counterparts in that they do not ap-
pear to have the “thirst for winning” that characterizes American
prosecutors. The best procedure, Findley argues, is one in which ad-
versarial zeal is combined in one office where a prosecutor and de-
fense attorney work together as “joint inquisitors”309 searching for the
truth and developing the evidence. While that will tend to address tun-
nel vision and other causes of wrongful convictions, it also goes be-
yond how inquisitorial systems are structured. Findley stresses the
importance of zealous advocacy for seeing multiple sides of a case but
at the same time promotes an Office of Public Advocacy (“OPA”),
where prosecutor and defense rotate and try to share perspectives.
Nothing like Findley’s OPA exists in continental procedure, and lat-
eral movement between defense and the office of the prosecutor is
very rare. But that does not mean it is a bad idea, and if exported it
might even improve the German court system. It is not easy to imag-
ine how that can work, but the ability to see both sides of a case and
not to become too drawn into a specific office culture helps to pro-
mote a truth-oriented investigation. When it comes to procedural
rights, Findley distinguishes between procedural rights and the search
for truth. Like most European systems, his model affords the defen-
dant almost all constitutional protections, apart from conflict of inter-
est protections.310 Findley is also optimistic that a “new culture of
objectivity and neutrality in police investigations”311 could develop
when all the evidence is shared and disclosed.312 That also is in line
with German procedure, where all evidence is collected in one file
that is openly shared among defense, prosecutor, and judge. Findley’s
model, however, does not offer controls for the actual decision-mak-
ing process, still relying on the jury, which remains the black box. How
the objective to find the truth is protected on appeal also is not fully
developed in Findley’s proposal.
States has), the idea of not becoming an object resonates with fundamental principles
of the German Constitution (especially the protection of human dignity). See
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Mar. 19, 2013, 2
BVR 2628/10, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20130319_2
bvr262810.html [http://perma.cc/UZ8K-JL2Y] (Ger.).
308. Findley, supra note 1, at 930.
309. Id. at 936.
310. See id. at 937.
311. Id. at 939.
312. Id. at 940.
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Slobogin’s hybrid model rests on a dual conclusion. First, ordinary
(as well as excessive) adversarialism is a “significant cause of various
sorts of error”313 and can generate inaccurate verdicts as a result of
lawyers’ truth-defeating strategies, expert witness bias, and the defen-
dant not testifying in “over half the cases that go to trial.”314 Second,
elements of the adversary system should be kept because, by placing
some control in the defendant, adversarialism enhances procedural
justice; and the adversary process is constitutionally grounded and
deeply embedded in legal attitudes.315
Slobogin’s model has the strongest inquisitorial features among the
proposals, putting the judicial tribunal in charge of actively discover-
ing the truth. Judicial control affects many other elements of the pro-
cess, more than he can address in his article. Slobogin does address
two important truth-related issues: expert witnesses and the defen-
dant’s unsworn testimony. Experts must remain neutral and are not
agents for either party. If parties disagree with an expert, they can
either obtain another court-appointed expert or retain their own.316 In
addition, because truth matters, Slobogin eliminates the danger of
perjury and allows (even encourages) the defendant to give unsworn
testimony.317 This would also affect the plea bargaining culture as it
exists in the United States. Judges would be much more involved in
assuring the truthfulness of the facts that underlie the plea.318
Slobogin’s suggested changes would demand an overhaul of not only
the existing criminal procedure but also the culture and training of the
judiciary. However, Slobogin’s overhaul does not affect the jury as the
fact-finder or the reviewability of its decision for factual errors. The
jury would hear evidence narratives in a less partisan way and would
be allowed to ask questions,319 but the “black box” decision-making
process itself would still be out of sight because the jury would not be
obligated to explain its decision in writing or in a special verdict.
Slobogin does not address how an appellate system would respond to
his suggested changes. But appellate proceedings must be different in
order to make the new model reviewable and enforceable. German
criminal procedure requires both a written verdict and ways to review
a verdict for factual accuracy, including asking whether the judge fol-
313. Slobogin, supra note 1, at 705 (including not just wrongful convictions but also
wrongful acquittals and punishment).
314. Id. at 705–07.
315. Id. at 710–15; see also David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 1634 (2009).
316. Slobogin, supra note 1, at 724.
317. Id. at 728.
318. Id. at 723.
319. Id. at 716–17.
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lowed the truth-finding objective. The scope of that review is not uni-
form and mainly depends on the severity of the case.320
IV. THEMATIC SUMMARY AND EVALUATION
The five proposals are exhilarating intellectual forays that force
readers to think hard about the nature and actual practices in Ameri-
can criminal courts and raise a host of questions. Although reconceiv-
ing the trial is not a new exercise in American legal thought, the
essays we review are driven by the sure knowledge that the actually
innocent are routinely convicted. But empirically grounding inno-
cence consciousness is a new thing. It gained a foothold in the 1990s
and early 2000s, and the legal community is only now acknowledging
it as a reality. While knowledge of wrongful convictions gives the pro-
posals urgency, it does not mean they are feasible or wise. Any reform
program will need to closely scrutinize the elements of the proposals
and take a closer look at the wrongful conviction problem itself. The
obvious fact that the proposals are not ripe for quick adoption is not
an excuse to jettison the reform project. Feasibility of adoption, in full
or in part, requires more thought. A second wave of analysis should
examine whether the proposals are overly complex or perhaps not suf-
ficiently worked out. Whether reform should occur piecemeal or in
toto is another question. More thinking is required about possible side
effects, positive as well as negative. We now review several issues.
A. What is the Problem?
The proposals acknowledge wrongful conviction as a significant
problem requiring reform. We agree, but not all American jurists and
lawyers may think that the numbers of known official exonerees—
more than 1,650 as of this writing321—justify radical action.322 There-
fore, reform campaigns at the state legislative or legal community
level will need to convince skeptics that the problem is significant. Al-
though the true number of actual innocence convictions cannot be
known, the most plausible lowest estimate, assuming about one mil-
lion felony convictions a year (with a .5% error rate) puts the number
of wrongful convictions at about 5,000 a year, with 40% (or 2,000)
receiving prison terms. A still-plausible 2% error estimate runs to
20,000 wrongfully convicted and 8,000 wrongfully imprisoned annu-
320. See Grunewald, Comparing Injustices, supra note 306, at 1186–87. It might
sound counter-intuitive but the more serious a case is, the less factual review is possi-
ble in Germany. See id.
321. THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/about.aspx [http://perma.cc/RB9K-WYRD].
322. Judge Alex Kozinski, by adding his trenchant voice, will likely cause thought-
ful jurists and lawyers to consider the possibility that from 22,000 to 110,000 American
prisoners may be innocent. See Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, supra note 15, at xiv–xv.
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ally.323 These estimates are based on a few empirical studies and a
qualitative analysis of the systemic weaknesses of the American crimi-
nal justice system.324 The latest and most statistically sophisticated es-
timate of death penalty miscarriages of justice established a
conservative estimate that the rate of exoneration among those sen-
tenced to death between 1973 and 2004 “who remained under threat
of execution for 21.4 y[ears] was 4.1% (with a 95% confidence interval
of 2.8–5.2%).”325 If every defendant in America sentenced to death in
323. Marvin Zalman, Qualitatively Estimating the Incidence of Wrongful Convic-
tions, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. 221, 225 tbl.1 (2012).
324. See Marvin Zalman, Measuring Wrongful Convictions, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3047 (Gerben Bruinsma & David Weisburd
eds., Springer 2014). Only one empirical study did not involve death penalty cases,
analyzing an unbiased cohort of 634 Virginia post-conviction sexual assault and/or
homicide evidence files that resulted in 715 convictions dating from 1973 to 1987.
Biological evidence retained in the files was subjected to DNA testing. In 5.3% of the
cases, the offender was eliminated as a source of DNA, and the DNA exclusion was
accompanied with probative evidence that appeared to support exoneration. In an-
other 2.5% of the cases, the offender was eliminated as a source of DNA, but the
exclusion was not accompanied with probative exoneration evidence. This is the
strongest empirical evidence to date that establishes the existence of a substantial
proportion of wrongful convictions in a sample of general cases, rather than in groups
of cases that were targeted because they appeared to be miscarriages of justice. And,
the likely percentage of innocent defendants is more than double the high “plausible”
qualitative estimate.
325. Samuel R. Gross et al., Rate of False Conviction of Criminal Defendants Who
Are Sentenced to Death, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7230, 7233 (2014), http://
www.pnas.org/content/111/20/7230.full.pdf [http://perma.cc/D8AG-ZEJM] (applying
statistical survival analysis to death-sentenced defendants). The study by Gross,
O’Brien, Hu, and Kennedy is the latest of only three studies of precise cohorts of
murder to death penalty cases. A complex analysis of 1992 murder commitments to
prison in New York estimated an error rate of 1.4%. Tony Poveda, Research Note:
Estimating Wrongful Convictions, 18 JUST. Q. 689, 697 (2001). An earlier study by
Gross and O’Brien examined 2,394 death sentences pronounced in US courts from
1973 to 1984 and calculated an exoneration rate of 2.3%. Samuel R. Gross & Barbara
O’Brien, Frequency and Predictors of False Conviction: Why We Know So Little, and
New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 927, 945 (2008). They
pointed out that the rate was likely higher because some innocent prisoners may have
been executed, forewent appeals, died from other causes, or had their sentences com-
muted to life terms. Id. at 946–47. Risinger compared two sets of defendants sen-
tenced to death for rape and murder against 11 DNA exonerations for those crimes
during comparable time periods. D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Em-
pirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
761 (2007). The numerator was discounted to 10.5 exonerations to produce a con-
servative estimate of 3.3%. Id. at 768–80. Although the latest Gross et al. study was
based on many non-DNA exonerations and only a few DNA cases and did not apply a
discount, as did Risinger, the authors acknowledged that “[s]ome exonerated defend-
ants are guilty of the crimes for which they were sentenced to death.” Gross et al.
supra, at 7234. But they also pointed out that “some innocent defendants who re-
mained on death row for more than 21.4 y[ears] but were not exonerated are misclas-
sified as guilty.” Id. The advance of this study is that it demonstrates that an estimated
death-row exoneration rate must account for the greater efforts to exonerate those
still under threat of death and estimates a likely exoneration rate for those executed,
resentenced to life, or who died by other causes (a censored population, to apply the
statistical term) by applying sophisticated statistical techniques (survival analysis and
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those years was executed, at least four innocent prisoners of every
hundred would have been killed.326 Perhaps more disturbing than that
conclusion was the finding that, once prisoners were removed from
death row, their exoneration rates fell sharply, because the urgency of
continuing the expensive and arduous legal exoneration process de-
creased.327 While keeping in mind that exonerations are proxies for
wrongful convictions, that the relationship of the two are subject to
further analysis, and that the plausible upper level of wrongful convic-
tions for the general run of felonies is subject to speculation,328 it is
safe to say that a prosecutor-generated extremely low rate of 0.027%
was bogus.329 This quick review makes it clear that exonerations are
few because the barriers to exoneration are great,330 the efforts to ex-
onerate the wrongfully convicted are enormous, and most wrongfully
convicted defendants will never be exonerated. In short, the problem
is large, affecting thousands or tens of thousands of wrongfully con-
victed defendants every year.
This issue will need to be argued in every reform venue because
most lawyers are ignorant of this knowledge. For all the wishful think-
ing about DNA exonerations, the justice system will never be able to
adequately deal with wrongful convictions through post-conviction ex-
onerations. Structural reform is imperative. But whether the five pro-
posals are the most appropriate remains in question.
B. Feasibility
Each author is aware of his proposal’s distance from current-day
criminal procedure. Risinger wrote that his suggestions “may appear
radical, and . . . [are] unlikely to be explicitly adopted by statute or
rule anytime soon.”331 Gross, Findley, and Slobogin call their propos-
als thought experiments.332 Among the five proposals, Findley’s Of-
the Kaplan-Meier estimator; sensitivity analysis) to generate an estimate that goes
beyond the raw proportion of death row exonerations of 1.6%. Id. at 7233–34.
326. See Gross et al., supra note 325, at 7231–34.
327. See id.
328. This includes the issues of false positives (exonerees who are factually guilty)
and false negatives (non-exonerated who are factually innocent).
329. See Samuel R. Gross, Souter Passant, Scalia Rampant: Combat in the Marsh,
105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 67, 69 (2006) [hereinafter Gross, Souter Pas-
sant]. Justice Scalia, concurring, incautiously repeated this figure in Kansas v. Marsh,
548 U.S. 163, 197–98 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring). His argumentative concurrence
can stand for the adversary lawyer’s penchant for both turning an examination of a
complex issue into a detailed forensic analysis of specific cases as well as the casual
use of data. There are forests and trees and times to look at the former.
330. “Convicted prisoners wishing to gain release on grounds of innocence face
formidable hurdles.” Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, supra note 15, at xv.
331. Risinger, supra note 1, at 1335; see also Bakken, supra note 1, at 547 (“This
Article proposes a fundamental change to the adversarial system and the American
criminal justice process.”).
332. Findley, supra note 1, at 914; Gross, supra note 1, at 1030; Slobogin, supra note
1, at 716.
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fice of Public Advocacy seems the least likely to be adopted, given its
radical restructuring of lawyers’ roles.333 Gross’s Investigative Trial is
also an unlikely candidate for adoption in toto, given its need to re-
calibrate the trial penalty to work. Yet, to the degree that it is
modeled on civil trials, it may be more feasible than Findley’s. Bak-
ken’s pro-innocence presumptions, proposed as a “fundamental
change to the adversarial system,”334 would generate fierce opposition
from prosecutors and raise questions about guilty defendants gaming
the system.
Attitudes about the likelihood of adoption run from the view that
adoption is impossible and that innocence advocates should work on
more feasible reform projects335 to the view that imminent implemen-
tation is less important than discussing these issues. Inherent in the
latter view is the hope that further discussion will lead to some trial
process reforms, perhaps less comprehensive, that improve accuracy.
We agree with Risinger that imminent adoption is unlikely.336 But be-
cause current trial processes do not adequately screen out erroneous
indictments, we believe the proposals are valuable starting points and
should be conversation starters in law schools, bar associations, think
tanks, professional legal organizations, and wherever else critical
thinking about the justice system takes place.337
Two potential roadblocks to adoption are the complexity of the
American adversary process and the vagaries of policy making in our
democracy. We note these concerns and set them to the side. Our
comparison of the proposals shows that just getting a handle on the
issues involved in trial process reform is no easy matter. Beyond the
items listed in Table 1,338 a practitioner could easily think of additional
factors that influence how a real legal system operates and can also
333. One might ask how lawyers would be trained for such radical departures from
advocacy, how such an experiment would be funded, and more.
334. Bakken, supra note 1, at 547.
335. That is, the list of canonical causes and reforms associated with them. See
supra note 10.
336. Yet, the remarkable example of the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Com-
mission (“NCIIC”), a state fact-finding post-conviction agency, offers hope that even
radical reform is possible under the right political conditions. See Christine C.
Mumma, The North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission: Uncommon Perspectives
Joined by a Common Cause, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 647 (2004) (describing the agency
that conceived the NCIIC); Christine C. Mumma, The North Carolina Innocence In-
quiry Commission: Catching Cases that Fall Through the Cracks, in WRONGFUL CON-
VICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 249 (Marvin Zalman &
Julia Carrano eds., Routledge 2014) (describing the organizational dynamics and
politics leading to the creation of the NCIIC) [hereinafter Mumma, Catching Cases].
337. The Authors acknowledge that this point needs additional research and discus-
sion and cannot simply be assumed; skeptics can raise serious questions about the
origin of wrongful conviction that ought to sharpen the insights of reform proponents.
338.  See supra tbl.1.
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result in error.339 Even the most feasible reform340 would require
years of discussion and support from, for example, a state bar commit-
tee, and then a state bar association, before vetting by state defense,
prosecution, and judges’ associations. Finding a sponsor in a judicial
committee of a state House of Representatives or Senate is crucial to
success. After sponsorship and three or four years of legislative hear-
ings, revisions, and inside review by the state’s attorney general, a bill
may get to the floors341 of the state’s legislative chambers, and might
have a chance of passage and signing by the Governor. We appreciate
that the concern of political scientists and policy analysts regarding the
policy implementation process is beyond the usual concern of legal
writing, but political and policy implementation will be essential; and
it is clear that the proposals, even implicitly, gave some thought to
feasibility.342 We set these concerns aside with the reminder that they
will have to be addressed when ideas move from proposal to policy.
To clarify this point slightly further: the vantage point we take is
systemic. We acknowledge that reforms could also happen on a local
or ad-hoc level, and we consider this as a possibility. Tim Bakken sug-
gests that a demonstration project could display the feasibility of
novel procedures.343 It would take just one district attorney with a
good working relationship with the police, a willing judge, and defend-
339. Findley and Scott, for example, review the impact on tunnel vision of evidence
law’s direct connection doctrine and hearsay exception for statements against penal
interest and argue for easing restrictions on such types of evidence proffered to bol-
ster the defendant’s innocence. Findley & Scott, supra note 4, at 342–46, 355–65. They
note that “our system typically does not prescreen evidence for reliability, but relies
on juries and cross-examination to test the veracity of evidence.” Id. at 358. These are
just two examples of the kind of system detail and complexity that will have to be
engineered into the proposals’ larger structural changes.
340. Possibly Risinger, which makes the fewest changes to the trial process and
focuses on one type of jury trial procedure. However, adding Risinger’s appellate
“safe verdict” standard complicates adoption, perhaps exponentially, because adopt-
ing the English standard opens the radical idea of appellate courts reviewing factual
issues. Yet, SIMON, supra note 9, at 202, suggests that appellate court review of facts
has “the potential to increase the diagnosticity of the adjudicative process.”
341. Floor in Nebraska.
342. Many law professors have experience in the legislative arena, but as academi-
cians their job, so to speak, is to propose policies and not to be directly concerned
with the details of implementation. For discussions about innocence policy implemen-
tation, see Nancy Marion & Marvin Zalman, Towards a Theory of Innocence Policy
Reform, in CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 175 (Sarah Lucy
Cooper ed., Ashgate 2014); Marvin Zalman & Nancy E. Marion, The Public Policy
Process and Innocence Reform, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 24 (Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano eds., Routledge
2014). For more extended coverage of policy development and implementation re-
garding innocence policies, see Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano, Sustainability of In-
nocence Reform, 77 ALB. L. REV. 955 (2013/2014). For a description of innocence
reform politics and implementation, see Mumma, Catching Cases, supra note 336; Re-
becca Brown & Stephen Saloom, The Imperative of Eyewitness Identification Reform
and the Role of Police Leadership, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 535 (2013).
343. Email from Prof. Tim Bakken to Dr. Marvin Zalman and Dr. Ralph Grune-
wald (June 14, 2015) (on file with the Authors).
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ants willing to waive the jury trial right to create a quasi-inquisitorial
court and trial experiment that might be well worth trying. It is some-
what surprising that in the two decades since the American innocence
movement was born, very little trial-procedure innovation has hap-
pened even at the county level. This is much in contrast to movements
like the Problem Solving Court, which demonstrates how a grassroots
initiative without much legislative support could develop a strong mo-
mentum and change existing court structures and practices.344
One aspect of feasibility that goes to the core of the proposals re-
quires further discussion: the concern with adversarial ideology.
C. Adversarial Ideology
All authors of the proposals were aware of gaps between adver-
sarial and inquisitorial models and understood inquisitorial proposals
to be a hard sell. That difficulty is illustrated in David Alan Sklansky’s
review of four constitutional law doctrines in which the Supreme
Court has seemingly entrenched “anti-inquisitorialism.”345 By this, he
means that a mental image of the continental justice system has
played a “broad and enduring” role in American criminal jurispru-
dence as an ideal “contrast model” to our adversary system. “There is
a broad consensus that the inquisitorial system can and should serve
as a kind of negative polestar for American criminal procedure.”346
Sklansky admits that scholars occasionally suggest borrowing from
European criminal procedure, “[b]ut these are voices in the wilder-
ness.”347 If the attitude he describes is limited to Supreme Court jus-
tices, it may not impede state-level procedural reforms, but Sklansky
makes a sociological assertion:
If they think about it at all, the vast majority of American scholars,
like the vast majority of American judges, are apt to agree with the
Supreme Court that “the civil-law mode of criminal procedure,” far
from meriting emulation, should be studiously avoided—indeed,
344. Problem Solving Courts do “not only resolve disputed issues of fact, but also
to attempt to solve a variety of human problems that are responsible for bringing the
case to court . . . . These newer courts, however, attempt to understand and address
the underlying problem that is responsible for the immediate dispute, and to help the
individuals before the court to effectively deal with the problem in ways that will
prevent recurring court involvement.” Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence
and Problem Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1055, 1055 (2003); see also
BERMAN, supra note 124.
345. Sklansky, supra note 315. The four areas Sklansky reviewed as seedbeds of
anti-inquisitorialism are (1) confrontation and the changes wrought by Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); (2) the Court’s confrontation cases regarding sen-
tencing and juries; (3) procedural default (including the debate about citing foreign
law); (4) and confessions law. Id.
346. Sklansky, supra note 315, at 1635–36.
347. Id. at 1638.
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that avoiding inquisitorial justice is what our own system is all
about.348
Although the point is not empirically supported and may be exagger-
ated for emphasis, it seems generally correct. American lawyers take
mandatory courses on civil procedure and evidence law in law school
and train to be adversary-style advocates; criminal procedure is a pop-
ular elective.349 Relatively few law students take comparative criminal
procedure seminars, which do not develop the kinds of skills honed in
clinical courses. Litigators—meaning virtually all criminal attorneys—
develop hard-won skills that make them adept in the arcane world of
American trial practice. When these lawyers become members of
prestigious bar committees or other venues in which law reforms can
advance, most are likely to be ignorant of continental criminal proce-
dure, even if not hostile to the idea.
One would expect that when the Supreme Court raises anti-inquisi-
torial rhetoric (“ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial sys-
tem”350) it would define what that “inquisitorial system” is. But the
Court does not. It uses “civil law system” and “inquisitorial system”
interchangeably without noting differences or explaining either.351 It
remains unclear what the Supreme Court thought was wrong with the
continental system “or how it threatened values that warranted consti-
tutional protection.”352 But even if the foundation of the contrast
model is thin, it can still lead to harmful stereotypes that are factually
wrong.353 Images are created that can stop lawyers from thinking be-
yond the scope of what they have learned in law school.354
Is change possible? On close inspection, Sklansky addresses an atti-
tude, not a constitutionally grounded rule—and attitudes can change.
348. Id.
349. Law students taking co-author Zalman’s graduate-school wrongful conviction
seminar have expressed astonishment at the grimy reality of criminal law from
sources like GARRETT, supra note 9, claiming that their law school criminal procedure
courses present an idealized version of legal practice.
350. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961).
351. See Sklansky, supra note 315, at 1639. Comparative scholarship usually de-
scribes “civil law” as a legal tradition that is based on codification and “inquisitorial”
as a type of a procedural system within a given tradition. See, e.g., PHILIP REICHEL,
COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 80 (6th ed., Pearson 2013).
352. Sklansky, supra note 315, at 1639. Sklansky further argues that this usage re-
flects the Court’s understanding that continental European legal systems “are still
identifiably the outgrowths of the inquisitorial systems of medieval Europe.” Id.
353. For example, in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50, 67 (2004), the Court
sees cross-examination as the greatest legal engine ever invented to “tease out the
truth.” It went unnoticed that inquisitorial systems have comparable instruments to
question the credibility of a witness. When the Supreme Court decided Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and stated “our adversary system of criminal proceed-
ings commences, distinguishing itself at the outset from the inquisitorial system,” id.
at 477, inquisitorial systems like the German already had established protections
against self-incrimination for almost ninety years.
354. See Sklansky, supra note 315, at 1641.
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Even though the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure interpretations
appear adamantly anti-inquisitorial, proposals that do not fit into
some adversary ideal may someday have a chance of acceptance.355
The imperfect discovery rule of Brady v. Maryland,356 for example,
has long been viewed as an adversary system modification,357 driven
by a concern about convicting the innocent. Thus, Brady’s “purpose is
not to displace the adversary system as the primary means by which
truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not
occur.”358 To guard against such miscarriages, the Court in Brady
modified party presentation of evidence—a central tenet of the adver-
sarial system. In the long view, the Supreme Court is a singular politi-
cal-legal institution that follows public opinion in its own way.359 As
such, it might eventually uphold “inquisitorial” modifications to the
adversary trial, depending on a constellation of factors including pub-
lic opinion, justices’ views of the seriousness of the wrongful convic-
tion problem, and shifts in the Court’s attachment to established
procedures.360
D. Ideological Attacks
Virtually every legal issue, no matter how abstract the subject, oc-
curs in a world of contest; criminal law is inherently conflictual. Even
a unifying issue like wrongful conviction (nobody is for it) has gener-
ated its share of questioning, from conservative doubts about the real-
ity of the problem to liberal fears that raising innocence issues for
some defendants will subvert the presumption of innocence for many
355. Despite anti-inquisitorialism displayed by the Court in its Confrontation
Revolution, id. at 1642–56, or the Supreme Court’s refusal to find a due process viola-
tion in a state’s denial of post-appeal DNA testing, District Attorney’s Office for the
Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 55–56 (2009), the passage of post-
conviction DNA testing statues without much criticism shows that accuracy can trump
ideological attachment to the forms of adversarialism. For a contrary view of Osborne,
see Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Due Process, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2919 (2010).
As Keith Findley put it, “Convicting the guilty and exonerating the innocent truly cuts
across political and ideological lines.” Keith A. Findley, New Laws Reflect the Power
and Potential of DNA, WIS. LAW., May 2002, at 20 http://www.wisbar.org/NewsPubli-
cations/WisconsinLawyer/Pages/Article.aspx?Volume=75&Issue=5&ArticleID=353
[http://perma.cc/9SWA-6BGB]. And across systemic lines, one might add.
356. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
357. “By requiring the prosecutor to assist the defense in making its case, the Brady
rule represents a limited departure from a pure adversary model.” United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 n.6 (1985).
358. Id. at 675.
359. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 269–323 (Harvard Univ. Press
2008) (presenting a chapter entitled, “The Supreme Court is a Political Court”).
360. The clash in Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (2006), between Justice Scalia’s
concurrence and Justice Souter’s dissent regarding the degree to which wrongful con-
victions constitute a critical issue is emblematic of the underlying concern. See Gross,
Souter Passant, supra note 329.
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others.361 Aside from the practical barriers created by inertia and a
psychological bias toward the value-laden adversary system, anti-in-
quisitorialism can take the form of conservative rear-guard sniping or
progressive pro-defendant protectionism. The proposals thus can ex-
pect to face double-barreled opposition from progressives and con-
servatives. Robert Mosteller’s cogent description of how difficult it is
for practicing defense attorneys to know with certainty whether most
clients are factually innocent362 explains his opposition to Bakken’s
and similar proposals. Mosteller rejects them on the ground that inno-
cence will “become a wedge issue” that fractures progressives into
blocs: those who support innocence reforms and others who support
only reforms (especially enhanced defense resources) that benefit all
defendants.363
Mosteller’s skepticism of proposals to create innocence trial proce-
dures follows other critiques by progressive defense lawyer-scholars
that centered on the fear that adopting innocence procedures would
cast a shadow on the vast majority of cases in which defendants are in
fact guilty of some offense. The concern is that as the public comes to
know of parallel innocence procedures, jurors in standard trials will
not be able to overcome their suspicions of the defendant’s guilt—in
effect destroying the always-fragile presumption of innocence.364 To
give this concern some credence, the innocence movement has posi-
tioned itself to move away from its natural base in the defense com-
munity to develop an “accuracy model” ideology,365 especially as it
advocates reforms that strengthen the defense while helping make po-
lice investigation and prosecution more accurate. Beyond fulfilling the
professional ethic that the guilty deserve skillful advocacy, defense
lawyers are essential to the larger society, in part because they blunt
361. See Morris B. Hoffman, The Myth of Factual Innocence, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
663 (2007); Margaret Raymond, The Problem with Innocence, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
449 (2001). Daniel Medwed, however, argues that innocence concerns will not under-
mine due process values. Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549.
362. Robert P. Mosteller, Why Defense Attorneys Cannot, But Do, Care About In-
nocence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (2010).
363. Id. at 2, 38–40 (footnote omitted); see also Robert P. Mosteller, Protecting the
Innocent: Part of the Solution for Inadequate Funding for Defenders, Not a Panacea
for Targeting Justice, 75 MO. L. REV. 931, 935 (2010).
364. See Raymond, supra note 361; Andrew M. Siegel, Moving Down the Wedge of
Injustice: A Proposal for a Third Generation of Wrongful Convictions Scholarship and
Advocacy, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1219 (2005); Abbe Smith, In Praise of the Guilty
Project: A Criminal Defense Lawyer’s Growing Anxiety About Innocence Projects, 13
U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 315 (2010); David Feige, The Dark Side of Innocence,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 15, 2003, at 15, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/15/magazine/
15ESSAY.html [http://perma.cc/S3WX-PYBR].
365. See Keith A. Findley, Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the
Innocence Movement Merges Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV.
133 (2008). As Risinger and Risinger demonstrate, the innocence lawyer role diverges
from that of a “cab rank” defense lawyer in several ways. Risinger & Risinger,
Emerging Role, supra note 154.
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the worst excesses of our present justice system’s exceptionally harsh
penalties366 and bring balance to a power structure where prosecutors
often get away with egregious violations.367 Moreover, defense law-
yers highlight cruel and excessive “supermax” prisons and the huge
damage that the mass incarceration system, fueled by the war on
drugs, has inflicted on state education and social services by hobbling
budgets for two generations.368
As if on cue, Paul Cassell, a noted conservative jurist—and one of
the first to tilt his lance against innocence arguments, even before the
modern innocence movement was born369—echoed Mosteller’s point
about the difficulties of picking innocence needles out of the guilty
haystack.370 Cassell asserted that fiscal limitations pressure defense at-
torneys to attack procedural defects in the evidence instead of its sub-
stantive qualities.371 Two of the proposals reviewed in this article
raised concerns that innocence procedures would allow guilty defend-
ants to “play the system,”372 and worse, increase the possibility of
wrongful acquittals. Slobogin avoids the problem by applying his
judge-run system across the board and eliminating party-control of the
evidence at trial. Gross is also alert to the difficulty of sorting the in-
nocent from the guilty;373 in recognition, he would create a disincen-
tive in the form of an increased sentence for innocence-procedure
defendants who dropped out and pleaded guilty. It is hard to know
whether this device would lessen false claims of innocence. There may
be something of a conservative red-herring aspect to the specter of
false acquittals.374 One false lead is to conflate the very large number
of non-reported and non-arrested crimes (which are social and police
system concerns and not flaws in the adjudication process) with the
366. See Goldstein, supra note 285.
367. See Alex Kozinski, Foreword of SIDNEY POWELL, LICENSED TO LIE: EXPOSING
CORRUPTION IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, at XI–XVII (Brown Books 2014)
(describing prosecutorial misconduct in prosecutions of Arthur Anderson executives
and Senator Ted Stevens); Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, supra note 15, at xxiii–xxiv.
368. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 184–89 (Jeremey Travis et
al. eds., Nat’l Research Council 2014); see also infra note 414 and accompanying text.
As the Authors note, adversary system lawyers should better understand the rights
protections that exist in continental criminal procedure. See supra Part III, Section C.
369. Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Comment: Protecting the Innocent: A
Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1988).
370. See Mosteller, supra note 362, at 13–30.
371. Cassell, supra note 37, at 1067–68, 1086–92.
372. As prisoners now do by asking innocence organizations to review their cases.
See Gwendolyn Carroll, Proven Guilty: An Examination of the Penalty-Free World of
Post-Conviction DNA Testing, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 665 (2007).
373. Gross, supra note 1, at 1014–21.
374. The case that innocence activism may increase crime was made in a convoluted
way, with scientific window dressing, by leading scholars. See Ronald J. Allen & Larry
Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 65 (2008). For a response, see D.
Michael Risinger, Tragic Consequences of Deadly Dilemmas: A Response to Allen
and Laudan, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 991 (2010).
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much smaller number of false acquittals in the 5% of cases that go to
trial.375 Although unable to provide definitive figures about false ac-
quittals or false convictions in jury verdicts, Givelber and Farrell’s
careful study of verdicts provides a basis “to suggest that when juries
acquit those who refuse to plead because they insist they are innocent,
those defendants are likely to be individuals who did not commit the
crimes with which they were charged.”376
E. Police Investigation and the Judicial Process
The impartial investigation is a central feature of the inquisito-
rial.377 Two of the proposals considered police investigation. Findley’s
OPA prosecutor and defense lawyer would jointly supervise police in-
vestigation and could jointly request additional investigation.378 Bak-
ken’s innocence plea would trigger innocence-oriented police
investigation.379 We cannot fault the other authors for not attending to
police investigation, as their chief focus was on the judicial process.
Yet the sharp separation of police from adjudication speaks volumes
about the structure of the American adversary system and the way
American criminal law scholars view “criminal justice” (i.e., law en-
forcement) as an allied but remote field akin to forensic science.380
Unless defendants (or prosecutors) have their own criminal investiga-
tors, the “facts” determined by fact-finders can go no further than the
facts that police investigators present.381 Local or county agencies in-
375. Cassell, supra note 37, at 1079 tbl.1, presents a table of the national crime
funnel that creates an especially scary picture of a tiny fraction of 6 million “violent”
crimes in 2006 that resulted in prison sentences. A closer view of the National Crime
Victimization Survey shows that 3.75 million of those “violent” (actually, “person”)
crimes were simple assaults in which 76% of the victims suffered no injury and the
other 24% slight injury, 173,000 were purse snatching/pickpocketing, and 230,000
were attempted robberies (of which 19% included injury). BUREAU OF JUSTICE STA-
TISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 223436, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2006 STATISTICAL TABLES tbl.1 (2008), http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/cvus06.pdf [http://perma.cc/XF9M-U5SH]. Person crimes are genuine con-
cerns that persist and need to be reduced—even after the great crime drops of the
1990s—but the “law and order” or “arrest and imprison” impulse is only a part of the
solution.
376. GIVELBER & FARRELL, supra note 289, at 142.
377. See supra Part III, Section A; see also Risinger & Risinger, Innocence is Differ-
ent, supra note 33.
378. See supra Part II, Section D.
379. See supra Part II, Section B.
380. To a significant degree, European law students study criminology. Michael
Tonry, Criminology and Criminal Justice in Europe, in PUNISHMENT, PLACES AND
PERPETRATORS: DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE RE-
SEARCH 21, 23 (Gerben Bruinsma et al. eds., Wilan Publishing 2004).
381. “The police, and then the prosecution in cooperation with the police, have a
monopoly on information gathering and assembly (vel non) in secret until a charging
decision is made. By the time any effective adversary involvement comes about, the
most important part of the case is often (or even usually) over.” Risinger & Risinger,
Innocence is Different, supra note 33, at 884–85. Slobogin cited Jerome Frank’s Courts
on Trial for the way in which trial advocacy can distort facts. Slobogin, supra note 1,
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vestigate and prosecute the bulk of crimes; police are executive-
branch agencies answerable to municipal or county government. Pros-
ecutors are mostly elected, executive-branch county officials. Al-
though prosecutors and law enforcement must interact and cooperate
to adjudicate cases, their relationship is essentially based on comity. It
may run smoothly, or it may be fraught with operational and political
obstacles.382
With regard to law, European police and courts are more closely
bound. In France, only two police agencies investigate crimes: the Na-
tional Police and the Gendarmerie. This suggests more uniform inves-
tigation standards throughout the country than may be the case with
America’s thousands of local law enforcement agencies.383 A signifi-
cant aspect of French law is the defendant’s limited right to request
that the examining magistrate conduct a specific investigation.384
at 705–06 (citing FRANK, supra note 11, at 82, 85–86). However, Frank also wrote
about the uncertainty of “facts” in law cases. FRANK, supra note 11, at 14–33 (writing
a chapter entitled, “Facts Are Guesses”).
382. See Cole, supra note 257.
383. See CHRISTINE HORTON, POLICING POLICY IN FRANCE 3 (PSI Research Re-
port No. 782, 1995). The National Police come under the Ministry of the Interior and
the Gendarmerie under the Ministry of Defense. Local police departments do not
have major crime investigation responsibilities. Id. at 26. Two major police forces are
designed to maintain a separation of powers and not allow all police power to fall
under one political agency. Id. Prosecutors, magistrates and judges are organized
under a central Ministry of Justice. Police officers cannot exercise full powers to inves-
tigate cases until they take a two-year part time study course and pass an examination
and are designated Officers of Judicial Police. Id. at 27. French police investigators
work under a double hierarchy, the police and the judiciary. Id. at 31. Police investiga-
tors rarely appear in court and a substantial part of the crime investigation is carried
out by the instructing magistrate (le juge d’instruction) who interviews suspects and
witnesses. Id. at 35. Judicial oversight of French investigations, at least in serious
cases, may lengthen the pre-trial investigative stage far beyond what is the norm in
the United States but will result in a detailed dossier. McKillop, supra note 284.
384. See Vogler, supra note 205, at 233–34.
[T]he examining magistrate must look with equal diligence for exculpatory
as well as for inculpatory factors, [but] the instruction does not operate on
the basis of equality between the parties. Whereas the prosecutor can “re-
quire” the examining magistrate to carry out certain investigations and may
appeal against any refusal to do so, the defendant and the civil party remain
in a somewhat less advantaged position. It is true that since 1993 they have
been able to file a “request” (demande d’acte) and a refusal by the examin-
ing magistrate to respond must be given in writing and is subject to appeal.
However, their rights of appeal are still inferior to those of the prosecutor
since all their appeals are subject to a “filtering process” by the president of
the instruction court. Also, the prosecutor has permanent access to the dos-
sier and his office is situated in the same building as that of his professional
colleague, the examining magistrate.
Id. at 205 (footnote omitted); see also McKillop, supra note 284, at 539–40 (describing
where the defendant in a murder case, after being asked by investigating judge if he
wished for additional investigations to be carried out, declined the opportunity); id. at
543–44 (describing a prosecutor who files a supplementary requisition to the investi-
gative judge, requesting a specific investigation related to revolver shots be
conducted).
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Germany has a decentralized, coordinated police structure where
each state controls its own police force. Despite the potential for great
divergence, there is considerable similarity between various state po-
lice agencies, due to tradition and comparable police laws. Under
German law, prosecutors are responsible for the investigation and are
vested with broad powers. The prosecutor is the “master of the inves-
tigation” (Herrin des Ermittlungsverfahrens) and has the authority to
give orders to the police. In many cases those directives are necessary
for legitimate investigative action because the prosecutor is not a po-
litical arm of the state but rather an impartial officer of the court and
a representative of constitutional values.385 In practice, police control
the investigations without being subject to a lot of oversight. “[T]he
great majority of police officers are also ‘auxiliary officers’ of the pros-
ecutor’s office, and can be dispatched to conduct further investiga-
tions.”386 Under specific (exigent) circumstances, those investigatory
officers have the right to conduct searches and seizures and to make
arrests. What we see in a description of the German system is a struc-
turally closer police-prosecution-court relationship. In cases of “minor
or medium seriousness, the police take responsibility for the
investigation”387:
The extent of interaction between the police and prosecutor de-
pends very much on the demands of the case, its seriousness and
whether special measures are needed in the course of the investiga-
tion. Thus informants, for example, are not generally used until the
prosecutor has agreed. In cases of serious crime, organised crime, as
well as some other high profile cases, there is close contact between
prosecutor and police throughout the case.388
German defense lawyers may conduct independent investigations
but do not have subpoena rights.389 Although the parties (prosecutor
and defense) “have neither control over the presentation of evidence
nor any power to seek a discontinuance of the proceedings,” the de-
fendant “has a right to participate actively in the process of establish-
385. LEIGH & ZEDNER, supra note 223, at 27. “When the office of public prosecu-
tor was created in 1848, it was considered as a judicial control over executive action
and that ideal [still] informs the German system.” Id.
386. Frase & Weigend, supra note 25, at 323. In 2004, the term “auxiliary officer”
(Hilfsbeamte) was changed to Ermittlungsperson, which translates to “investigatory
officer/person,” in order to account for the changed relationship between prosecutor
and police. Police are not in a mere supporting (helping) role anymore; they conduct
investigations independently and with little direct supervision by the prosecutor.
387. LEIGH & ZEDNER, supra note 223, at 28.
388. Id.
389. Frase & Weigend, supra note 25, at 341. The right of compulsory process is
guaranteed by the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST., amend. VI, and was in-
corporated through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to apply to
state and local cases. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967).
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ing the truth by putting questions, making suggestions . . . or bringing
motions to take further evidence.”390
F. The Jury
All the models, save Gross’s,391 keep the jury as the main fact-
finder in light of its constitutional status and its deep roots in Ameri-
can culture.392 Keeping the jury raises questions of verdict accuracy
when considered against the many wrongful jury verdicts among
known exonerations.393 Some indirect empirical research has sug-
gested significant jury error rates. Baldwin and McConville drew on
opinions of participants in English jury trials to estimate questionable
results in 36% of acquittals and 5% of convictions.394 Bruce Spencer
assumed that juries found guilty 25% of defendants who, in the eyes
of a judge, should have been acquitted; this resulted in a 10% jury
error rate.395 Against this, Givelber and Farrell offer some support for
jury accuracy and Risinger suggests that juries perform at least as well
as judges in state-of-mind cases.396 The mixed data raise questions re-
quiring more careful exploration before adopting a reform proposal,
particularly regarding whether judges are more accurate or likely to
acquit an innocent defendant.397
Even the most inquisitorially oriented pre-trial and trial procedure
will not achieve greater accuracy if it is ultimately the unreformed jury
390. Huber, supra note 244, at 291 (citations omitted).
391. Gross, supra note 1, at 1026, 1028.
392. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 27–36 (1965) (stating that defendants can-
not waive federal jury trial without consent of court and prosecution and tracing the
rule through common law and colonial history).
393. See Update: 2012 THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.u
mich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/NRE2012UPDATE4_1_13_FINAL.pdf
[http://perma.cc/4ZWF-Z2K3]. As is well known, almost all of the early DNA exoner-
ations have resulted from jury verdicts. In 2012, the National Registry of Exonera-
tions reported that among the first 1,050 exonerations, 82.2% were convicted in jury
trials 7.0% were convicted in bench trials, 9.4% pleaded guilty, and data for type of
adjudication was unknown in 1.2% of the exonerations. Id. at 5. As the National Reg-
istry of Exonerations reports more non-DNA cases and more exonerations from
crimes less serious than murder and rape, the proportion of exonerations resulting
from jury trials can be expected to drop. In 2014, 38% of reported exonerations re-
sulted from guilty pleas, the highest rate and part of a trend. NAT’L REGISTRY OF
EXONERATIONS, EXONERATION IN 2014 3, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exonera
tion/Documents/Exonerations_in_2014_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z7KA-PK26].
394. JOHN BALDWIN & MICHAEL MCCONVILLE, JURY TRIALS 54, 86 (Clarendon
Press 1979).
395. Bruce D. Spencer, Estimating the Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 305, 317–18 (2007).
396. GIVELBER & FARRELL, supra note 289; Risinger, supra note 1, at 1308–10.
397. Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, supra note 15. Judge Kozinski has weighed in
heavily on the score of jury accuracy: “I’ve heard judges say that they seldom or never
think juries reach the wrong outcome. I am skeptical of such claims.” Id. at xviii. He
pointed out that observation of juries is rare and drew on his experience both as a
juror in two state trials and as a judge who debriefs juries in cases he presides over to
address the vagaries of jury decision-making. Id. at xviii–xx.
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that decides. A good deal of empirical research aimed at improving
jury accuracy exists but adoption of reforms has been spotty. An ear-
lier comprehensive review suggested that
future research should examine the effects of the following: (a) us-
ing court-appointed experts, (b) pre-instructing jurors, (c) providing
jurors with written copies of judicial instructions, (d) revising/simpli-
fying judicial instructions, (e) allowing jurors to take notes and/or
ask questions during the trial, (f) having judges and/or attorneys
provide summary comments on the evidence, and (g) using verdict
forms that include interrogatories. It is clear from this review, as
well as considerable research conducted with mock jurors, that ju-
rors are often uncertain or confused about their task, a condition
only slightly lessened by discussing the judge’s instructions with
other jurors during deliberation. Most of these areas have received
some initial attention, but the results so far have been modestly en-
couraging, certainly not overwhelming. Much more work is
needed.398
These suggestions assume that with sufficient guidance the jury can be
transformed into an accurate fact-finder. Courts see jurors’ “inexperi-
ence [as] an asset because it secures a fresh perception of each trial,
avoiding the stereotypes said to infect the judicial eye.”399 It is beyond
the scope of this Article to summarize the research that questions the
jury’s ability as a fact-finder400 or to be able to understand the instruc-
tions.401 In the end, it might be the lack of legal experience (and not
the lack of instructions) that make a juror’s task difficult.402 Lacking
398. Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research
on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 622, 712 (2001). Judge Kozin-
ski offered six suggested jury reforms, including telling juries what the sentencing
ranges are. Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, supra note 15, at xx–xxi.
399. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 355 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) (citation omitted).
400. See Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
95, 130 (1996).
401. Bradley Saxton, How Well Do Jurors Understand Jury Instructions? A Field
Test Using Real Juries and Real Trials in Wyoming, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 59,
120–21 (1998) (“The study suggested that Wyoming juries are working hard to apply
the instructions they receive; our juries routinely spend significant amounts of their
deliberation time reading and discussing the instructions. Wyoming’s jurors also gen-
erally seem to feel that the jury instructions are helpful and not unduly hard to under-
stand. Unfortunately, the study also revealed that many jurors thought that they had
understood the instructions better than they really had. A significant number of jurors
who participated in the study had misunderstood key aspects of the instructions, even
if they were not aware that they had done so. And at least some of the ways in which
some jurors are misunderstanding instructions could be affecting the outcomes of
both criminal and civil trials.”).
402. Despite the fundamental role of the trial judge, German criminal procedure
employs lay assessors, who are part of the bench and who have the same rights as
judges. Depending on the case, lay assessors might even outnumber professional
judges. Lay assessors are not (and in general cannot be) legally trained; however, they
all have to undergo some training. In contrast to the United States, lay assessors are
appointed for a term of five years and not just for a single case.
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professional knowledge and experience, jurors can only use familiar
mental constructs to form truth and justice from the evidence.403
The proposals probably retain the jury because it is constitutionally
guaranteed. This weakens claims that the proposals are inquisitorial
but supports viewing them as hybrid models. As noted above,404 im-
partial fact-finding and judicial oversight form the essence of the in-
quisitorial. This means that the fact-finder has to seek all the material
facts to try and determine the objective truth. The inquisitorial judge
has to inform himself about the relevant facts. But in the adversarial
process, the jury (or judge when acting as a fact-finder) cannot avail
itself of evidence beyond what is presented. There is no right or op-
portunity to request more proof or even clarification, as is the case in
Germany and other inquisitorial countries. In other words, the impar-
tial investigation is one thing; contextualizing and processing facts,
making sense of them, and maybe asking more questions is another.
That whole process is in the hands of an inquisitorial judge but is di-
vided up into two parts in the adversarial: adversaries present facts
and juries process them. For as long as the divide between impartial
investigation (police, prosecutor) and fact-finding (jury) exists, an idea
of instruction, that allows the fact-finder to be involved in the con-
struction of the facts, will be difficult to achieve.405 None of the au-
thors except Gross, whose model does not keep the jury, addresses
this issue.
The proposals did not discuss the jury in detail, perhaps because the
authors sought to advance novel ideas about the trial process and re-
forming the jury is an established area of research for psychologists of
law.406 A full-fledged reform proposal, however, should make jury ac-
curacy reform more of a priority. From an inquisitorial perspective,
the adversarial element of the passive fact-finder is fundamentally
inconsistent.
G. Defendants’ Rights
An area where most of the reform models differ from European
trial systems is the degree to which they abridge defendants’ rights—
especially the privilege against self-incrimination, but also Fourth
Amendment rights and, in Gross’s model, the jury trial.407 Slobogin
403. See Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity
in a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REV. 39, 54–55 (1994).
404. See supra Part III, Section A.
405. The concept of instruction is explained in Part III, Section A, supra. The Au-
thors are aware that the value of “instruction” is relative, in the sense that it might
lead to tunnel vision. Therefore, as will be pointed out later, the Authors trust in
proceedings that allow the introduction of the other possible story through adversarial
lawyering. See infra Part V.
406. See e.g., NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT
(Prometheus Books 2007).
407. Gross, supra note 1, at 1023.
252 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3
and Bakken agree. Furthermore, Gross maintains that “innocent de-
fendants have comparatively little to lose by giving up the privilege
against self-incrimination: if they tell the truth and are believed, they
will be released. Many innocent defendants are anxious to tell the au-
thorities whatever they know.”408
According to Slobogin, the defendant is “probably the single most
important source of information about events relating to the of-
fense.”409 Slobogin gets around Fifth Amendment protections by sug-
gesting that defendants “be cajoled into giving unsworn testimony
describing their side of the story.”410 The meaning and scope of “cajol-
ing” does not become quite clear, but depending on the degree of
zealous advocacy that remains in the system, the defendant might put
himself into jeopardy by testifying, especially if innocent. Although
Slobogin does not go as far as the other authors in limiting Fifth
Amendment rights, he still seems to assume that the defendant should
make (in our eyes) potentially harmful statements.
As a matter of logic, eliminating the Fourth Amendment exclusion-
ary rule cannot lead to wrongful convictions, because possession of
contraband signals guilt and the exclusionary rule itself allows the
guilt to escape justice. Is this so in practice? Some legal scholarship
has linked defendants’ rights to inaccurate verdicts411 and to that end
the Burger Court created a hierarchy of constitutional rights related
to factual truth, “with those rights that are trial related at the top, the
[F]ifth [A]mendment privilege in the middle and the [F]ourth
[A]mendment right with its unpopular remedy of exclusion at the bot-
tom.”412 One consequence of the exclusionary rule is widespread po-
lice perjury covering illegal searches,413 but even then one may argue
that the police are using the evidence against “bad guys”—or so it
seems from applying the abstract logic of single cases to mass action.
Extravagant fears of crime and drugs have led to a four-decade mas-
sive increase in prisoners generated by harsh sentencing laws, police
incentives, bipartisan political support, a runaway prison-building pro-
gram,414 and an enabling role by a conservative Supreme Court that
408. Id.
409. Slobogin, supra note 1, at 707.
410. Id. at 716. Under the German system, defendants are only obligated to make
statements regarding their personal background (job, date of birth, etc.) but are never
put under oath and cannot perjure themselves. See id. at 728.
411. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judg-
ments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970); Stephen J. Markman, Six Observations on the
Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 425, 429–30 (noting “enormous”
human suffering of an estimated 55,000 criminals turned loose).
412. Charles H. Whitebread, The Burger Court’s Counter-Revolution in Criminal
Procedure: The Recent Criminal Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 24
WASHBURN L.J. 471, 478–84 (1985).
413. Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311 (1994).
414. TRAVIS C. PRATT, ADDICTED TO INCARCERATION: CORRECTIONS POLICY AND
THE POLITICS OF MISINFORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Sage 2009); MICHELLE
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shredded Fourth Amendment protections.415 It is no longer possible
to fall back on brittle logic to support believing that every convicted
drug possessor was factually guilty.416 In too many cases, the war on
drugs has corrupted or overwhelmed American police departments,
leading to a rise of police corruption and wrongful convictions both in
pleaded-to drug convictions and tried homicide convictions.417
From a comparative viewpoint, it is striking how great a pragmatic
and political function fundamental rights like the Fourth or Fifth
Amendments have to serve in the United States. Indeed, to a large
degree, the decades-long pseudo-rational debate about the exclusion-
ary rule was driven by the Burger Court’s (and later the Rehnquist
and Roberts Courts’) ideological support for the politicized and futile
“war on drugs.” Nobody in Germany would argue that if the defen-
dant claims his innocence, he has to relinquish his procedural rights,
nor would they accept that even illegally obtained evidence is admissi-
ble. In Germany, the discourses involving truth and rights are distinct
from one another. That should be a model for the United States, but
our more politicized justice system, from elected county prosecutors
to a polarized Supreme Court, makes achieving such an ideal remote.
A debate about adopting trial reforms should consider not only the
pure logic of rights denial but also the unintended consequences.
H. Judge Control
Vesting significant decision-making power in a single judge, an im-
portant inquisitorial feature of German criminal justice, comes with
the potential risks of wrongful conviction based on tunnel vision. Data
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLOR-
BLINDNESS, REVISED EDITION (2d. ed., The New Press 2012).
415. A plethora of law review articles have analyzed the “drug exception” to
Fourth Amendment rights. See, e.g., Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging
“Drug Exception” to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889, 908–10 (1987).
416. Again, Judge Kozinski frontally challenged the comfortable myth that “guilty
pleas are conclusive proof of guilt.” Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, supra note 15, at
xi–xii.
417. Hannah Laqueur et al., Wrongful Conviction, Policing, and the “War on Crime
and Drugs”, in EXAMINING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: STEPPING BACK, MOVING
FORWARD 93 (Allison D. Redlich et al. eds., Carolina Academic Press 2014); see also
Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/nov/20/why-innocent-people-plead-gui
lty/ [http://perma.cc/3F5X-HVY7]; NATE BLAKESLEE, TULIA: RACE, COCAINE, AND
CORRUPTION IN A SMALL TEXAS TOWN (Public Affairs 2005); Dylan Purcell, Judge
Reverses 58 Drug Squad Convictions, PHILA. INQUIRER (June 21, 2015), http://articles
.philly.com/2015-06-21/news/63649844_1_perry-betts-narcotics-officers-convictions
[http://perma.cc/UE2T-AXJR] (describing reversals laid to work of six Philadelphia
Police Department Narcotics Field Unit officers who, although acquitted of federal
criminal corruption charges, are still believed to have been responsible for as many as
1,370 false drug convictions because of planted evidence, doctored paperwork, and
beating and robbing suspects). The link between mass incarceration and wrongful
convictions was more tentatively advanced by C. RONALD HUFF ET AL., CONVICTED
BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND PUBLIC POLICY 146–50 (1996).
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on wrongful convictions in Germany is scarce, but highly publicized
cases show that tunnel vision was a dominant factor.418 In a system
based on the impartial judiciary ideal, “adversarial checks (such as
when the defense introduces an alternate perpetrator story) are lim-
ited, at least in the earlier stages of the proceedings. Judges rely only
on prosecutors’ indictments to decide whether to allow cases to pro-
ceed to trial; and according to critics, they bias themselves by presid-
ing over cases to which they earlier admitted having enough evidence
(hinreichender Tatverdacht) for a conviction. Strong ties with prosecu-
tors on this and other levels have raised doubts as to how one-sided a
trial can (but not necessarily must) become.419 Most of the known
wrongful conviction cases in Germany show symptoms of tunnel vi-
sion, leading German scholars to rely on American ideas and ideals in
calling for more adversarial checks throughout the trial.420
Objections to judicial questioning, in Slobogin’s view, present a rel-
atively minor hurdle to judge control.421 He notes that judge question-
ing is constitutional as long as the parties can question and cross-
examine witnesses and that some courts have raised concerns about
judge questioning biasing the jury. Even assuming that judges are pre-
pared with information from a dossier-like file about the case, it seems
likely that many elected trial judges who practiced in the adversary
system will be hesitant to take the lead in questioning. As Slobogin
creates a system for all cases, some judges will defer to the lawyers to
conduct trials while others may become more inquisitorial, producing
the uneven trial practice application. Most elected judges will not ex-
hibit the same level of procedural uniformity as judges in continental
Europe, where an intricate system of statutory laws and precedent
tries to achieve consistency within the judiciary. Gross avoids this
problem by finding judges who would relish an inquisitorial role and
assigning them to investigative trials while leaving standard trials for
judges who preferred the old way.422
418. This is especially true in sexual assault cases that lack physical evidence. See
Grunewald, Comparing Injustices, supra note 306, at 1191.
419. The German term for the feared relationship between prosecutor and judge is
Schulterschluss (literally, “touching/locking of shoulders”), meaning that both entities
stand very close together.
420. Slobogin argues for a neutral, court-appointed expert to increase the overall
objectivity of the fact-finding process. Slobogin, supra note 1, at 723. This is very
much in line with how the German system employs and uses experts. However, there
has been an increasing debate in German scholarship about the problem of cognitive
biases that judges develop by being too close to the experts they pick. It has long been
argued that, especially in cases of false accusations of sexual assaults, judges tend to
trust experts to a high degree and are rarely able to consider “dissonant” aspects.
Grunewald, Comparing Injustices, supra note 306, at 1191.
421. Slobogin, supra note 1, at 718–19.
422. Gross, supra note 1, at 1027–28.
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A recent study by Prof. Paul Marcus,423 not discussed by the pro-
posals, provides a more comprehensive and empirical-legal view of
just how entrenched party control is in American courts and the de-
gree of hostility to judges asking questions. Marcus examined the law
and questioned more than eighty experienced lawyers and judges in
five adversary systems about judges addressing the jury: “The law on
judges summarizing evidence for jurors is settled and reasonably clear.
In Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and England and Wales, the prac-
tice is permitted, and may be required. In the United States, with but
a few exceptions, the practice is expressly forbidden.”424 American
case law that supports judicial commentary to jurors is mostly dated,
and a number of state statutes and constitutions forbid judges from
charging juries on matters of fact.425 Federal law allows judges to com-
ment on the evidence, and while at least one judge spoke out in favor
of the practice, the “prevailing view in the United States was force-
fully set out by federal appeals judge Pierre Leval[:] . . . ‘It appears
that the giving of a flight instruction is a vestige of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries . . . . For good reason, that practice has
fallen into widespread disfavor, absent special circumstances.’”426
Not only are judges allowed to address the juries on questions of
fact in the other common law systems, but the evidence obtained by
Marcus shows that the practice is widespread and strongly supported
as a sensible way to help the jury perform its function properly. Mar-
cus spoke to dozens of American lawyers and judges throughout the
United States and drew on his own experience to find that “there was
nary a dissent to the view that judges simply never summarize the
evidence for jurors.”427 Several reasons were given for the American
practice. The most important was that “it is the job of the lawyers to
explain the theories of their cases, and it is the job of the jurors to sort
through the evidence.”428 Other reasons included the value of careful
jury instructions, the concern that the judge will bias the jury, and the
notion that it is simply not the role of the judge.429 On a deeper level,
we find ideological and cultural explanations: the jury is “seen as a
bulwark against overly aggressive government behavior,”430 and sev-
eral quotations expressed a deep faith in the ability of juries to come
up with the correct verdict.431 Time and efficiency may also play a
role. Marcus gathered data to show that the time it took judges in
Australia to address the jury on law, evidence, and summarizing the
423. Marcus, supra note 262.
424. Id. at 5.
425. Id. at 12 & n.53.
426. Id. at 14 (citing United States v. Mundy, 539 F.3d 154, 158 (2d Cir. 2008)).
427. Id. at 25.
428. Id. at 37.
429. Id. at 37–39.
430. Id. at 40.
431. Id. at 41–43.
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case could range from as little as one and one-half hours in five-day
trials, to as long as six hours in twenty-day trials; anecdotal evidence
indicated that jury charges could take many hours or even days.432 In
contrast, the delivery of American pattern instructions normally takes
no more than an hour to ninety minutes, even in complicated cases.433
Aside from Marcus’s findings that suggest far greater roadblocks to
Slobogin’s judge-control model, what is apparent is that the jury—
enshrined in the Constitution434 and revered, or at least given lip ser-
vice, by American lawyers—is the institution that leads the American
legal community to view judge control with suspicion.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has reviewed five error-reducing trial reform proposals
with inquisitorial elements in light of German and continental proce-
dure to set the stage for continuing discussion. Our review of conti-
nental practice emphasized that contrary to common stereotype,
modern German and continental criminal procedure strictly enforces
defendants’ rights, including the exclusion of illegally seized evidence.
We showed that judicial dominance of European trials involves a com-
plex institutional and practice-culture framework based on impartial
investigation. As four proposals retain an unreformed jury and at least
four maintain party presentation of evidence, it appears they do not
fundamentally change the existing adversary system. Most introduce
elements of a more balanced investigative process that allows defend-
ants to raise innocence claims and affords defendants varying kinds of
innocence procedures. Four proposals introduce procedures for those
claiming innocence rather than for all defendants who are presumed
innocent under the law. No inquisitorial system has anything compa-
rable to that.
Although we do not propose an elaborate reform model, we offer a
few caveats and suggestions. First, we are not sure whether institu-
tional support exists for trial process reform among innocence organi-
zations. Law school clinics must train their students to be excellent
adversary-system lawyers.435 Innocence organizations located in pub-
lic defenders’ agencies, or prosecutor’s integrity units for that matter,
operate in the adversary system and are unlikely to have any energy
or desire to rethink their operating environment. Even if innocence
432. Id. at 33–34.
433. Id. at 49.
434. U.S. CONST., art. III; id. amend. VI.
435. Keith A. Findley, The Pedagogy of Innocence: Reflections on the Role of Inno-
cence Projects in Clinical Legal Education, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 231 (2006); Jan Stig-
litz et al., The Hurricane Meets the Paper Chase: Innocence Projects New Emerging
Role in Clinical Legal Education, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 413 (2002).
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clinics operate inquisitorially when investigating cases,436 that investi-
gation is in preparation for adversary engagement. Without the insti-
tutional support that innocence organizations have given to canonical
reform issues,437 trial reform proposals may remain an academic
exercise.
Second, keeping criminal justice system reforms separate from ac-
tual innocence issues may reduce wrongful convictions, although it
will be impossible to detect effects with social scientific research. Post-
1973 exonerations listed in the National Registry of Exonerations oc-
curred as American criminal justice was driven to wretched excess by
a politicized war on crime that has only recently been subjected to
serious question. If the number of annual convictions will drop from
about one million to, say, 750,000 in a few years, if drugs are largely
decriminalized and police give up the asset forfeiture “tax” of individ-
uals caught in their nets, if police and prosecutorial agencies are
“right-sized” but adequately funded (by tax appropriations) to focus
on community crime prevention and the apprehension of serious
felons, and if criminal defense is reasonably funded—then in theory,
the number of wrongful convictions would decline without any efforts
to modify the adversary system. If this makes sense, innocence organi-
zations should vigorously support “smart-on-crime” initiatives.
Third, if we had to support one trial procedure reform for policy
action, we would cautiously support the most feasible proposal with
the lowest risk of unintended consequences. That might be Risinger’s
relatively modest changes to trial procedures, without adding his ap-
pellate standard that would require American appellate courts to un-
dertake fact review. States that wish to re-think post-conviction
review are well advised to observe the North Carolina Innocence In-
quiry Commission.438
Finally, examining the proposals as a springboard for our own mod-
est (or piecemeal) reform suggestions, what kind of change do we pro-
pose?439 We would focus on two reform areas that might have more
“bang for the buck.” First, as the vast majority of convictions result
from plea bargaining and there is no assurance that guilty pleas are
more accurate than trials, Gross and Slobogin were right to be con-
436. See Daniel S. Medwed, Actual Innocents: Considerations in Selecting Cases for
a New Innocence Project, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1097 (2003).
437. See, e.g., Model Legislation, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocencepro
ject.org/free-innocent/improve-the-law/model-legislation [http://perma.cc/V8N3-
G84V].
438. See Mumma, Catching Cases, supra note 336.
439. A counter-argument is that piecemeal reform may make matters worse. This
suggests that no changes should be made unless a legislature were willing to funda-
mentally change its state’s adversary system. Given the impossibility of eliminating
the jury or creating a European-style system, with non-elected prosecutors and
judges, and a deep culture of inquisitorial justice, the Authors very much doubt that
such fundamental changes are feasible or even wise.
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cerned with it. Rather than being seen as a distortion of the “elegant”
adversary trial, plea bargaining should be recognized as its own sys-
tem, as Gerard Lynch made clear.440 Rules created by legislation or
court rule should consider proposals that: require open discovery;
modify the prosecutor’s role vis-a`-vis the defense lawyer (looking to
Findley); give judges more authority to probe the facts of the case (a`
la Gross and Slobogin); require judges to produce a fact summary
(borrowing from continental practice); and reverse rules that bar
judges from discussing cases with the attorneys (and perhaps with pro-
bation officers). With a view to Bakken, developing statutory pre-
sumptions could give the process some teeth. We do not
underestimate the difficulty in fashioning such a proposal and do not
work out the details here. Given the challenge of plea bargaining
modifications, states may consider developing a trial system on an ex-
perimental basis, perhaps among volunteers in large multi-judge
courts with a research component built in to track the process and
results of a modified approach. Indeed, Professor Slobogin extended
his analysis in a forthcoming article,441 asserting that the current plea
bargaining regime is incompatible with (1) retributivism (the current
reigning sentencing theory), because in the course of bargaining the
prosecutor offers two possible sentences, and only one can be in sync
with the goal of retribution; and (2) the constitutional framework of
an “open, confrontational procedure.” Arguing it is impossible to
change plea bargaining, Slobogin proposes that American jurispru-
dence shift to a theory of preventive sentencing, along the lines of the
Model Penal Code, and that it abandon the adversarial element of
party control, adopting a form of inquisitorialism that draws on his
analysis in the article reviewed herein. Without further analysis,
Slobogin’s separate extension of his inquisitorial approach simply ac-
knowledges the obvious fact that any major change to improve adjudi-
catory accuracy must encompass plea bargaining.
The second reform area that may have a real effect on potential
innocence cases, without modifying the trial process, would look to
the ability of French and German defendants to request further crimi-
nal investigation where reinvestigation may divulge evidence of fac-
tual innocence.442 The proposal would require legislation creating a
440. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2117, 2120 (1998).
441. Slobogin, Plea Bargaining, supra note 251.
442. See supra note 383. Zalman made a similar proposal. Zalman, Adversary Sys-
tem, supra note 13. Under German law, defendants can apply to the trial judge to take
further evidence. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure], as
amended, § 244(3), translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/ger-
man_code_of_criminal_procedure.pdf [http://perma.cc/BJZ9-BAY6] (Ger.). That mo-
tion may be rejected for reasons that pertain to the evidentiary value of the evidence
requested, but it can also be rejected if the sole purpose of the motion is to protract
the proceedings. Id.
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limited right to reinvestigation. With the legislation should come addi-
tional funding for such investigations, which could be directed to a
state bureau of investigation or specified investigative units in large
municipal or county detective bureaus. The order for additional inves-
tigation would be made by the trial judge, after a motion and con-
tested hearing in which the defense would (a` la Risinger) point to a
specific fact issue that could be dispositive. Such a procedure might
include a request for expert witnesses on the point. The procedure
would not require the defense attorney to affirm a belief in innocence,
as proposed by Bakken, but would be in the traditional role of adver-
sary lawyering. Possible sanctions, however, could be part of the pro-
cess if an attorney is shown to abuse the process (perhaps more likely
in organized crime or some white-collar prosecutions). A factor in or-
dering reinvestigation might be the wealth or ability of the defense to
conduct its own investigation. Constitutional support for such a pro-
posal can be found in Ake v. Oklahoma.443 Again, although we view
this sketch of a proposal as relatively feasible, we do not underesti-
mate the amount of detail and effort that would be required to make
it a reality.
This Article explores five error-reduction trial and pre-trial proce-
dural reform proposals with the hope of stimulating further considera-
tion, debate, and action. The five proposals are not the only ones
suggesting ways to reimagine criminal adjudication,444 and further re-
flection will need to sort out a broad array of ideas to determine the
most effective and feasible. Rethinking the American adversarial pro-
cess is a dynamic enterprise, as demonstrated by the fact that at least
two of the authors reviewed herein have already built on the articles
reviewed herein.445 It is certainly audacious to tackle the very heart of
the adjudicatory process of a mature legal system with a deeply em-
bedded legal culture. But this new generation of trial reform thinking
diverges from past efforts because of new awareness that convicting
the innocent is an everyday reality in our courts. In the tradition of
American appellate judging, the five proposals can be thought of as
seriatim opinions, dissenting in their own ways from the standard
American adversary trial process. Like all great dissents, they are
written for an alternate, and a better, future.
443. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
444. See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text.
445. See Risinger & Risinger, Innocence is Different, supra note 33, at 893 & n.71
(citing Bakken, supra note 1); Slobogin, Plea Bargaining, supra note 251, at 13 & n.50
(citing Slobogin, supra note 1).
